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The Global Africana Review (GAR) is now in its third year of publication and remains an 
example of our commitment to our goal of featuring student academic research conducted in the 
Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies, which represents disciplines 
that include Anthropology, Comparative Literature, Development Studies, Film, History, Human 
Rights, Linguistics, Music, Political Science, and Public Policy. 
The volume begins with Emily Venturi’s article, which examines migration as an extension 
of the foreign policy agreement established between Senegal and the European Union to 
determine how this relationship impacts migration management within security development. 
The next article by Bailey Nelson explores how lawyers during the Civil Rights Movement 
empowered others, by becoming what she terms “activist lawyers,” and in the process helped  
propel social change that led to desegregation and the end of the Jim Crow era. In his article, 
Alexander Peeples examines how women in Tanzania organized political movements from the 
era of liberation movements to the contemporary period. The article argues that “non-elite 
women continue to be disproportionately politically marginalized” in discourses about women’s 
equality. Finally, Angum Check’s article on US anti-apartheid activism and the work of the Anti-
Apartheid Support Group (AASG) at UNC-Chapel Hill demonstrates the group’s contributions 
and the challenges underpinning its emergence and evolution on campus. 
This volume offers two scholarly book reviews. Andre Tyson’s review of Double Negative: 
The Black Image and Popular Culture by Racquel Gates (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018) 
examines Gates’ work on how certain reality television shows use negative images to challenge 
the limits of black respectability politics. Kevyn Robinson discusses The Age of Garvey: How a 
Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global Black Politics by Adam 
Ewing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Robinson interrogates how Ewing 
examines Marcus Garvey’s life, looking into his ideology and efforts in a way that contextualizes 
his early life and ascent, and, uniquely, humanizes the black leader. 
We are very proud of the work produced by our students, and as the Executive Editor of this 
volume of the GAR, I applaud them for their contributions and commitment to research. 
 
 
Dr. Charlene Regester 
Executive Editor, Global Africana Review 
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Migration Management Within Security and Development Narratives: A Case 






The 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration between African and European leaders brought 
migration management to the forefront of foreign policy and cooperation relations. With a focus 
on bilateral relations between Senegal and the European Union since the launch of new 
instruments linking migration and development policy, the following study analyzes the driving 
interests for Senegalese and European counterparts regarding the treatment of migration as a 
foreign policy topic and its linkage to development and security issues. The research draws on 
evidence from interviews conducted in 2017 in Dakar, Brussels, and Rome with representatives 
from the Senegalese government, the Italian government, European Union institutions, the 
African Union Delegation to the EU, national embassies, NGOs, and think-tanks, among others. 
All interviews were conducted by the author. While bilateral relations for migration management 
were found to be of strategic interest for both parties, this article concludes that their 
securitization framework places a strain on development objectives and long-term relations 
between Senegal and the EU, due to the EU’s short-term prioritization of readmission demands 
and the reduction of irregular migration. 




Since the attention sparked by what is commonly referred to as the “Central Mediterranean 
migration crisis” in 2014,1 the insertion of migration into bilateral relations between African and 
European states has steadily increased through new cooperation instruments, funding packages, 
political statements, and diplomatic visits. During an interview at the EU Commission, an 
official stated: “With the new Partnership Framework, migration became one of the central 
                                                             
1 In conjunction with the onset of the Syrian civil war and the destabilization of Libya in 2011, 
between 2012 and 2015, EU member states collectively observed a 294.53 percent increase in 
asylum applications (Eurostat 2019). We must also consider that the European Union currently 
hosts only 6 percent of the world’s displaced population, and that migration is not a 
unidirectional flow toward Europe, as is often presented in studies and in European rhetoric. 
Despite the comparative contextualization of the EU’s migration pressures, the percentage 
change in asylum applications toward EU member states is still generally regarded as a pertinent 
exogenous shock to EU policy-making, and will therefore be considered as such for the purposes 
of this study. 
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aspects in EU external policy and development work. Before it was one of many sectors. This is 
something that is now systematically looked at” (Interview, EU Commission DEVCO). 
The 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration formally consolidated migration as a priority for 
European–African cooperation on trade, security, and development, and announced the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) as a development funding package aimed at tackling 
the “root causes” of destabilization, displacement, and irregular migration (EU Commission 
2019), effectively linking the management of migration flows to development cooperation. 
Shortly thereafter, the Migration Partnership Framework was also launched as a set of bilateral 
agreements between the EU and five priority countries: Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, and 
Senegal. This article expands upon a broader research study that used Senegal as a case study to 
examine the issue-linkage of migration management and development policy in EU external 
relations through instruments such as the EUTF and the Migration Partnership Framework. It 
showed the instruments’ preliminary outcomes to be compromised within a securitized 
cooperation framework, both in terms of strengthening development cooperation as well as 
managing migration (Venturi 2018). This article examines evidence from the aforementioned 
research study to analyze in depth the implications of the current cooperation arrangements on 
migration, development, and security on bilateral relations between Senegal and the European 
Union. Drawing from expert interviews, a literature review, and the analysis of key multilateral 
and international agreements, the article will first evaluate the implications of Senegal’s 
domestic and international roles in managing migration flows, and the country’s cooperation 
history with the European Union. The study then presents and analyzes the driving interests 
expressed by Senegalese and EU authorities to: (1) treat migration as a foreign policy issue; and, 
(2) treat it through issue-linkage instruments with development policy. Finally, by introducing a 
securitization lens and arguing in favor of broadening the debate to a tripartite nexus of 
migration, development, and security in the Sahel region, the article uses this framework to 
present its findings on the evolution of Senegal’s relations with the EU and with Italy, an EU 
member state that holds a policy-driving role in the setting up of migration management 
instruments. While bilateral relations and cooperation on migration management are found to be 
of strategic interest for both parties, this article concludes that a securitization framework places 
a strain on development objectives and the long-term relations of Senegal with Italy and the EU, 
due to the EU’s short-term prioritization on reducing irregular migration and Italy’s prioritization 
on advancing readmission demands. 
 
Research Methods 
The article draws on evidence from interviews conducted with EU policy officials between May 
and July 2017. I use qualitative data from interviews with officials located in Brussels (Belgium) 
and Dakar (Senegal) representing the EU Delegation to Senegal, and from the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for International Cooperation and Development (DG 
DEVCO) and for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), the EU Parliament’s Committee on 
Development, the European External Action Service, and High Representative/Vice-President 
(HR/VP) Federica Mogherini’s Cabinet. At the national level, officials were interviewed from 
the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, the Senegalese Ministry of 
the Economy, Finance and Planning, the Senegalese Embassies in Belgium and Italy, as well as 
the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, and the 
Italian Embassy in Senegal. Because approaches to migration management are affected by an 
actor’s relative proximity to a crisis, the interview methodology was designed to engage with 
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EU, Senegalese, and Italian actors across locations and contexts. Differences in approach, for 
example, to national government headquarters compared to embassies on foreign soil are 
highlighted. Interview data also includes information gathered from interviews with the African 
Union Delegation to the European Union and with non-governmental actors such as NGOs, 
think-tanks, foundations, and academics. 
 
Senegal’s Migration History and Recent Developments 
Senegal is historically known for the heterogeneity of its migration flows. As it is a country of 
migration origin, transit, and destination, Senegalese authorities work to tackle migration from 
the perspectives of a variety of interested parties, including the EU. Within the EU’s external 
relations for migration management, Senegal is one of sixteen countries of priority focus and one 
of the five countries that signed the Migration Partnership Framework with the EU in 2016. 
Domestically, the Senegalese government is currently strengthening its national approach to 
migration management. Migration is already incorporated in the Plan Sénégal Émergent, 
President Macky Sall’s policy framework aimed at getting Senegal on the road to development 
by 2035. Senegal’s migration agenda has therefore taken a strong orientation toward the 
migration–development nexus. For example, an official at the Senegalese Embassy in Belgium 
underscored the role of Senegalese youth in the country’s development, and the subsequent 
“priority of Senegalese authorities to maintain young people at home” (Interview, Senegalese 
Embassy in Belgium). Furthermore, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Finance and 
Planning is currently heading a shared institutional effort to draft the Politique Nationale de 
Migration du Sénégal, Senegal’s national policy framework for migration management. 
Senegal’s domestic migration policy developments are relevant when evaluating its foreign 
policy relations, its state agency, and its national interests in working with the EU on migration 
management. 
As for their cooperation history, the EU and Senegal have been working jointly on 
development policy for approximately fifty years, in what an official at the EU Delegation to 
Senegal described in 2017 as “an excellent relationship with Senegalese authorities” (Interview, 
EU Delegation to Senegal). In terms of joint migration management, Senegal has a close 
working relationship with Spain and the European Union due to the 2005 spike in migration 
flows departing from Senegal for Spain’s Canary Islands. Since the EUTF’s launch in 2015, 
Senegal has been one of the largest beneficiaries of development funding from the EUTF, with a 
total budget of EUR 161.8 million (USD 183.7 million). EU funding finances nine development 
projects across Senegal aimed at tackling “root causes” of migration, ranging from employment 
creation and food security in regions of high emigration potential, to diaspora investment 
facilitation and the setup of a national biometric identification system. However, the EU’s 
allocation of development funding within the EUTF and its renewed interest in cooperating with 
Senegal since the Central Mediterranean crisis have occurred in the absence of a significant spike 
in Senegalese migration rates to Europe between 2010 and 2017 (World Bank 2019a, 2019b, 
2019c). This consideration is noteworthy because it raises questions that will be addressed in this 
study with regard to the evidence of and driving interest in the recent increase in bilateral 
cooperation between Senegal and the EU. 
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Mapping Senegalese and EU Interests in Bilateral Engagement on Migration Issues Within 
Development and Security Narratives 
At an EU institutional level, significant evidence highlights the EU’s push to include the 
management of migration in foreign policy and development cooperation relations with partner 
countries. In 2016, the European External Action Service, the diplomatic service of the European 
Union, outlined the centralization of migration in EU foreign policy: “Migration management 
will become an important dimension in the EU’s foreign policies and instruments, ranging from 
diplomacy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, to development and climate” (n.p.). 
Evidence at the EU member state level points toward the stagnation of strategies for burden-
sharing arrangements, and domestic reforms such as the Common European Asylum System and 
the Dublin Regulation, as factors that encourage an external and foreign policy approach in order 
to deliver responses on migration management (Interview, Open Society for European Policy). 
When asked about Italy’s role in advancing EU migration legislation that focused on foreign 
policy rather than on domestic reform for integration, relocation, and resettlement, a 
representative from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
answered: “The more we ask for internally, the more they [EU institutions] give us externally” 
(Interview). 
This study also uncovered evidence of Senegalese interest in including migration 
management as a foreign policy issue with European counterparts. An official at the Senegalese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined the Senegalese government’s interest in engaging with the 
European Union on migration issues. From an economic standpoint, the official stated: “Today 
we are in a process of economic diplomacy. In this economic diplomacy process, it is important 
to favor the maximum amount of foreign direct investment” (Interview, Senegalese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad). Van Criekinge (2010) not only underscores the same 
point, but also further argues that the EU’s need for cooperation in migration management has 
increased Senegal’s negotiation leverage in terms of direct policies and development 
programming closer to its own national interests. 
In addition to Senegalese and EU interest in engaging on migration in foreign relations, the 
specific linkage of migration management to development programming can be argued to be a 
path dependent on insertion into pre-existing bilateral relations. Migration management enters a 
pre-existing framework of historical colonial legacies and development aid structures. Models of 
path dependency identify positive feedback loops as responsible for ensuring the consistency of 
institutional arrangements. For example, an official at the EU Commission described the choice 
to link migration management to development funding: “I think that it has been the easiest, 
especially in the eyes of members. It’s just been the easiest to pour [in] more money, whether 
that’s good or bad, whether it’s useful or not. One year after we see the limitations” (Interview, 
EU Commission DEVCO). This is evidence of a short-term and consensus-driven approach in 
the decision to link migration to development funding as a primary instrument for the 
externalization of migration management accountabilities. 
Within issue-linkage, Nyberg-Soresen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Hear raise the risk of policy 
divergence between migration and development objectives, asking: “Can long-term goals of 
global poverty reduction be achieved if short-term migration policy interests are to be met? Can 
partnership with developing countries be real if tackling illegal migration is the principal 
European policy goal?” (2002, 50). Extensive literature challenges the utilization and 
instrumentalization of a historically produced “development discourse” (Nyberg-Soresen et al. 
2002, 59). Anthropologist Arturo Escobar argues that in the post-World War II period, Western 
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economic and governance models were presented as the long-term goals of development 
programming, and that “development has achieved the status of certainty in the social 
imaginary” (2012, 5). Kenyan-American human rights scholar Makau Mutua interrogates the 
interest of foreign donor governments in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). When evaluating 
the international funding of human rights NGOs in Kenya during the country’s precarious wave 
of democratization, he notes that “donor funding is essentially the story of the historically 
managed development of the African state” (Mutua 2013, 158). 
Lastly, in addition to the risk of instrumentalization of development programming, security 
objectives need to be considered when setting the stage for the drivers of EU–Senegal relations 
for migration management. The concept of “securitization” was introduced by Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wœver and Jaap de Wilde (2013) of the Copenhagen School. Securitization delineates a process 
through which policy choices unrelated to security become “securitized” when actors attach a 
national security value to them. Since the Cold War, securitization has also affected the 
allocation and implementation of official development assistance (ODA), giving rise to the 
notion of “securitization of development.” Concerns around the securitization of ODA exist not 
only with regard to the agendas of donor governments, but also with regard to the use of the 
development funding by governments receiving aid, such as the Ethiopian and Ugandan regimes’ 
arguable use of Western security initiatives in the 1990s to build militarized and strongly 
authoritarian states (Fisher and Anderson 2015). Because the primary stated goal of migration 
policy in almost all developed countries is fighting irregular migration, Baggio and Zanfrini 
(2006, 65) identify securitization as an impediment to the constructive issue-linkage of migration 
and development. Indeed, the European Agenda for Migration states the control of irregular 
migration as a central objective (European Commission 2015). 
In this study, security interests were expressed in interviews by EU officials, who cited 
irregular migration and policy pressures from EU member states as reasons for such a 
framework, as well as by Senegalese government officials, who cited the issues of counter-
terrorism, regional migration flows, and cross-border security. In particular, when discussing the 
Migration Partnership Framework, an Italian Embassy official stated: “Increased cooperation 
among police forces can only be beneficial in order to avoid the most pathological outcome, 
namely terrorism” (Interview, Italian Embassy in Senegal). Interview outcomes therefore 
illustrate a significantly securitized context for cooperation on migration policy. 
Within the identified Senegalese and EU strategic precursory interests in treating migration 
as an issue within foreign policy, the use of development funding and the centrality of security 
prerogatives are also shown to affect bilateral cooperation. Next, I evaluate the preliminary 
effects of issue-linkage instruments for migration management on bilateral relations. 
 
Preliminary Outcomes for Senegal–European Union Relations  
In light of the new instruments created after the 2015 Valletta Summit, the preliminary 
observations and outcomes of Senegal–EU relations focus on three issues: (1) the controversial 
node of readmission demands; (2) project ownership within development programming; and, (3) 
bilateral and continental approaches to mobility and irregular migration. 
In their 2013 study, Beauchemin, Kabbanji, Sakho, and Schoumaker demonstrate the 
primacy of security in European border management and control objectives, and accordingly 
argue that diplomacy between African and European leaders is centered on European 
readmission demands. Building on the trend identified by Beauchemin et al. in 2013, this article 
further reveals that after the 2015 Valletta Summit, representatives from the Senegal and EU 
Venturi Migration Management – Senegal and the EU 
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institutions also identified the primacy of European national government readmission demands 
within EU–Senegal relations. An official from the EU Delegation to Senegal in Dakar explained, 
“It is important that the priority of some EU member states to send migrants back does not take 
hostage our relations, which are much larger and much richer than this” (Interview, EU 
Delegation to Senegal). An official at the Senegalese Embassy in Belgium also noted: “It is 
necessary to find the right equilibrium so that the focus is not exclusively on readmission and 
returns” (Interview, Senegalese Embassy in Belgium). The centrality of identification and 
readmission demands within European national security and irregular migration narratives, 
coupled with the absence of a significant increase in readmissions despite the new cooperation 
instruments (Interview, EU Commission DG HOME), is thus found to be a point of strain within 
bilateral relations. 
Secondly, the use of development funding for migration management has generated 
Senegalese pushback in terms of project ownership within the activities funded by the EUTF and 
within the Migration Partnership Framework. As one interviewee stated, “What shocked me the 
most was that there are projects identified in Brussels, the appropriation of these projects, 
projects that are managed by European actors” (Interview, Open Society Initiative for West 
Africa). Interviews with the delegations of European member states to Senegal also uncovered 
concerns with regard to what was described as an “arbitrariness” of EU development funding 
distribution. An official at AECID (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el 
Desarrollo) noted the renewed influx of funding and interest driven by EU officials, despite the 
stabilization of Spain’s cooperation efforts with Senegal since the 2005 migration management 
crisis between the two countries (Interview). Officials at the Italian Embassy also noted that the 
money that Italy received from the EUTF was being managed primarily by Italian NGOs 
(Interview, Italian Embassy in Senegal). While all projects are now reported to have at least one 
Senegalese partner, significant concerns persist as to their design and the levels of local 
ownership, and the long-term goals for the country’s partnership with the EU. 
Lastly, multiple officials repeatedly underscored the difference in the approach of African 
and European representatives to cooperation for migration management. An official of the 
African Union Delegation to the EU highlighted the African Union (AU)’s commitment to 
pursuing a continental policy framework based on the principle of mobility and development, 
rather than a focus on border control and migration management. When describing the AU’s 
discussions with the EU in the lead-up to the Valletta Summit, an AU official stated: “The 
discussion was mostly on migration…the European temple was not interested in mobility” 
(Interview, African Union Delegation to the EU). Furthermore, with regard to the EU’s push for 
bilateral rather than continental coordination, the official stated: “For now your rationale is that 
you are focusing on hotspot countries, but what about us involving everybody before countries 
become hotspots tomorrow. But if you have been dealing with the EU, you realize that the EU as 
an institution is not a proactive institution. Mostly all EU policies are reactive” (Interview, 
African Union Delegation to the EU). A representative of the Senegalese Embassy in Belgium 
also criticized “the tendency of the EU to separate African countries for cooperation efforts” 
(Interview). Overall, preliminary observations on Senegal–EU relations underscore the role of 
short-term issues such as readmissions, project ownership, and hotspot security within the 
broader long-term framework for a partnership effort. 
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Preliminary Outcomes for Senegal–Italy Relations 
Due to the incomplete delegation of migration and asylum competencies by EU member states to 
EU institutions, it is necessary to also analyze Senegal’s bilateral relations with EU member 
states. Interview outcomes with regard to Senegal’s relations with Italy focused on the primary 
themes of: (1) identification and readmission; (2) legal migration; (3) politicization and the role 
of public opinion; and, (4) remittances. 
The issue of readmissions arose as central within Senegal–Italy relations due to a push for 
increased collaboration on migrant identification, and inclusion of irregular migration as part of 
the Migration Partnership Framework. A representative from the EU Delegation to Senegal 
highlighted how the EU had facilitated a mission to Italy for Senegalese authorities to verify the 
conditions of Senegalese nationals, and to collaborate with the Italian government for their 
identification and return (Interview). In interviews, both Senegalese and Italian counterparts 
noted the limited utility of the Senegalese identification mission. A representative from the 
Italian Embassy in Senegal highlighted the absence of a “unitary position” within the Italian 
government on bargaining tools for the reduction of irregular migration and the need to treat 
readmissions delicately (Interview). Parallel to that of readmissions, observations around 
bilateral relations also arose with regard to the comparatively lower focus on the expansion of 
legal migration opportunities in Italy and EU member states, despite the Valletta Action Plan’s 
pillar on increasing avenues for legal migration. During an interview at the EU Commission 
DEVCO, officials underscored that EU member states have maintained control over legal 
migration issues: “We cannot work on legal migration apart from strengthening institutions that 
work on legal migration because that is not our competence.” An official from the Senegalese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad also spoke of pressuring the national 
authorities of Italy and EU member states to allow the legalization of Senegalese workers: 
“There are young people who are in an irregular status but that contribute a lot to their 
[European] economies…They must be legalized” (Interview). When discussing readmission and 
legal migration, a driving issue in interviews with Italian and EU officials was the concern for 
public opinion outcomes. As one representative expressed, “Elections are won and elections are 
lost over these issues” (Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation). In response to European concerns about public opinion, an official at the 
Senegalese Embassy in Belgium stated, “It must [be] remembered that African leaders also have 
a public opinion that they need to satisfy” (Interview). 
Despite the above-described issues within Senegal–Italy relations, interview outcomes also 
point to an overall shared understanding and commitment to the importance of bilateral relations 
for migration management. For example, the issue of remittances was widely cited as a primary 
factor of consideration within bilateral relations. For Senegal, personal remittances are the first 
source of foreign currency and accounted for 10.62 percent of the national GDP in 2017 (World 
Bank 2019d). Accordingly, the Senegalese Ambassador to Italy stated: “Italy has now become a 
factor of stability in Senegal” (Interview). The long-term strategic interests in managing 
remittances and in increasing channels for mutually beneficial legal migration are juxtaposed 
with short-term readmission demands, security narratives, and public opinion concerns within 
Senegalese and Italian bilateral relations. 
  




While the insertion of migration into foreign policy relations was shown in this study to be of 
strategic interest to Senegal and the European Union, the instrumentalization of development 
discourse and practical programming, as well as the prominence of security priorities and 
securitization trends, were also identified as precursory factors to be considered when evaluating 
bilateral cooperation – not only in terms of effectiveness, but also in terms of its influence on the 
long-term relationship between Senegal and its EU counterparts. The centrality of short-term 
securitization narratives within the EU priority of fighting irregular migration and advancing 
readmission demands plays a primary role in cooperation relations, and is also met by strategic 
Senegalese economic and security interests within negotiations for migration management. 
Overall, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Migration Partnership Framework, as 
issue-linkage instruments for migration management, play a role not only in short-term 
cooperation prioritization, but also in the long-term nature of the partnership between Senegal 
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The civil rights era was a period of unveiling and combatting discrimination against, and unjust 
legal treatment of minorities in the United States. This article discusses how the unconventional 
participation of influential lawyers in the civil rights movement was necessary in counteracting 
these norms. It was crucial both during and after this period for these legal advocates to ensure 
the public of their commitment to a transformation of the justice system by connecting with the 
diverse members of their community. This article serves to trace the valiant efforts of such 
lawyers in North Carolina and the South, allowing for a better understanding of the actions that 
were needed to provide change that has benefitted all minorities in this country, and by 
extension, the world. 




In the midst of the civil rights movement, activists acted as the voice of oppressed Americans. 
However, many cases arose where activists needed the assistance of lawyers when their efforts 
were blocked by the legal system. This article examines how representatives of the Southern 
Justice Institute were not only prepared to defend activists in this situation, but were also willing 
to fight among them as activists themselves. It was common for many lawyers during and after 
this period to simply offer assistance in proving one’s innocence to the court. However, this firm 
made an extensive effort to become involved in the movement in a way that was much larger 
than the courtroom. Looking at how lawyers worked outside of the normal requirements of their 
position raises a series of questions that demonstrate how the members of the Southern Justice 
Institute and other firms battled outside forces – and even some within their own legal system. 
The literature that was analyzed for this research portrays the extent of direct and indirect 
influences that lawyers faced during the civil rights era and even beyond this period. This article 
asks if there is any real difference between activists for social movements and lawyers, and, if so, 
how do these roles differ? Finally, what were the underlying motivations for these lawyers to 
take on these cases? Through analyzing scholarly articles and archival sources that address the 
specific practices of lawyers, this article examines the unique strategies employed by those of the 
Southern Justice Institute and other lawyers of the period. Observing the life of lawyers outside 
of the Southern Justice Institute helps to create a thorough understanding of the motives behind 
the actions of lawyers who doubled as activists, such as Julius Chambers. In spite of the odds he 
faced, Chambers grew to become a dedicated lawyer who practiced putting the needs of the 
community above anything else. Growing up in the Jim Crow era motivated him to fight against 
oppressive conditions and help to provide a progressive future for generations to come.  
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The Creation of a Civil Rights Ally 
During the civil rights era, lawyers and law firms exposed many injustices related to human 
rights and had a significant impact on attempts to remedy them. The Southern Justice Institute is 
a unique example of the determination and effort expended by a collective group of people, in 
order to bring justice to those treated unjustly. The lawyers of this firm prided themselves on 
their commitment to revealing the unfair treatment of minorities at the local and national levels. 
Additionally, their efforts brought social transformation by addressing these mistreatments 
through the use of activism. The firm also produced skillful and effective lawyers who used 
varied approaches that gained them national attention, and who possessed the essential 
characteristics necessary for making an enduring impact on the civil rights movement. These 
lawyers, along with others in the southern states, demonstrate the capacity required to ensure 
positive outcomes in the civil rights era from a legal and social perspective. Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, they led by example, providing other lawyers throughout the south with 
approaches that focused on a broader goal than simply gaining victory in court. 
The Southern Justice Institute began in Washington DC as the southern division of the 
Christic Institute, but was subsequently moved to several other locations. It was opened in 1985 
under the direction of Lewis Pitts in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, as the Christic Institute 
South, then was moved to Carrboro in 1986, and then to Durham in 1991 (“Southern Justice 
Institute Records, 1978–1993” n.d.). Its first board, created in Winston-Salem in 1986, was made 
up of members representative of the diverse community. Over a short span of time, the board had 
four black members, two women members, and three who lived below the poverty line (Christic 
Institute-South n.d.). The diverse array of members illustrates the firm’s dedication to not only 
supporting racial equality, women’s empowerment, and income equality, but also its validation 
of and faith in these particular groups facing discrimination. The firm’s chosen board members 
had a crucial role in the firm’s mission to assist minorities in the community, and many of these 
members had a history of contributing to social movements. One member, Sara Nelson, served 
as the executive director of the firm for many years and was an essential member in fighting for 
women’s rights. She was greatly involved in the National Organization for Women and also the 
Equal Rights Amendment ratification campaign in Oklahoma (The Christic Institute – An 
Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy n.d.). Another skilled board member and lawyer 
who specialized in the field of income equality and racial justice was Lewis Pitts, whose 
involvement and expertise in certain cases demonstrated the importance of his role in the firm 
and several social movements. Pitts was a longtime activist of the Southern Justice Institute and 
his many contributions helped it prevail as a well-known public interest law firm (The Christic 
Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy n.d.). While these board members 
were greatly responsible for the success of the firm as well as progressive role models in the 
community, many other factors can be considered equally beneficial to the firm. 
Due to the ample outpouring of support of the board members, various organizations, and 
community members, the Southern Justice Institute was able to participate in many arduous civil 
rights cases. The firm was fortunate to have dozens of financial contributors, many of which 
were organizations such as foundations and churches, as well as other movements dedicated to 
supporting racial equality and women’s rights. The firm’s major funders in the late 1980s 
included the Boehm Foundation, Fund for Southern Communities, Deer Creek Foundation, News 
World Foundation, and J. Roderick MacArthur Foundation (The Christic Institute – An Interfaith 
Center for Law and Public Policy n.d.). These organizations and others assisted the firm in any 
way they could, but the funding they provided dramatically propelled the firm’s efforts to serve 
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justice. The financial support also helped with initiating various projects throughout the years. In 
analyzing the firm’s finances through balance sheets and its fund balance statements, a spike in 
donations is evident from 1989 to 1990. At the beginning of 1989, the firm had a fund balance of 
$346,741 that decreased to $192,183 by the end of the year. However, due to an increase in 
various contributions from donors and revenue from special events and projects, 1990 saw an 
increase in the fund balance, which began the year at $192,183 and ended the year with $482,096 
(The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy n.d.). This illustrates the 
support and allegiance of contributors committed to achieving the same goals as the firm. 
As a public interest law firm, the Southern Justice Institute’s motives and approaches can be 
understood as focusing on unveiling injustices and bringing attention to social issues, rather than 
simply seeking justice for their charged clients. The firm was adamant about representing those 
that truly needed their help in order to advance their cause, so to qualify to receive their 
representation one had to be “a leader or political activist in a local empowerment or progressive 
issue group” (The Christic Institute South – Serving the Movement for Peace and Justice n.d.). 
This illustrates one of their overall goals of providing equality to those affected by social issues. 
By providing this assistance, the lawyers were using their status to present the voices of these 
activists to the community. Law firms generally want the best for their client, but this law firm 
was dedicated to striving for a broader goal than solely winning in court. This institution also 
sought to use the benefits of grassroots support through educational and religious resources to 
gain momentum in effecting social change. 
The Southern Justice Institute often used approaches such as creating media and educational 
resources to draw attention to topics and issues, due to the belief that increasing awareness 
would, in turn, create a larger support system for combatting social injustices. One way that they 
used the media to attain this goal was through creating magazines, periodicals, books, audio 
tapes, and videos that could be circulated within the community and beyond (The Christic 
Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy n.d.). Pamphlets and brochures were 
also created that included an overview of cases, lawyers, funding options, and other topics to 
convey their mission. The firm also had board members and lawyers speak at churches, colleges, 
seminars, and political organizations. In order to reach a broader audience, the firm was 
committed to communicating the efforts of their lawyers and their overall motives by 
outsourcing to international television, computer networks, and national broadcasts (The Christic 
Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy n.d.). These types of communication 
can be viewed as much more complex and extensive than those performed by most law firms in 
this period, but their mission was also much larger than that of a typical firm. 
The firm usually only took on three or four cases a year in order to commit adequate time to 
each case, and its lawyers were adamant about being focused on revealing social problems. They 
believed that defending their clients should come second to this goal. The institution strived to 
address many local cases that would benefit their community because of their firm belief in 
creating a change at home that could eventually branch out to have a significant social impact 
nationwide (The Christic Institute – An Interfaith Center for Law and Public Policy n.d.). Aside 
from this belief, they also felt passionate about representing cases that would have an effect at 
the national level, especially with regard to empowering women and people of color (Christic 
Institute South – Defending the Movement for Racial Justice and Political Empowerment in the 
South n.d.). Another characteristic of the firm was its keen focus on giving the most attention to 
cases that would receive little attention from the press or even a fair trial in court. Cases that 
were thought to have little chance in making progress could often be overlooked, and the 
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Southern Justice Institute’s lawyers felt it was their responsibility to give a voice to these 
community members and activists. A good example of this were the cases involving the 
harassment of government officials, which received much of the firm’s funds and other 
resources. These cases received a lot of attention both locally and nationally due to their 
controversial nature, as they stemmed from racial biases in the government that were common 
during this time. The interest that the Southern Justice Institute took in their clients’ cases further 
serves as evidence of their courageous endeavors to challenge higher powers. 
 
Activism in the Civil Rights Era and Beyond 
The cases involving the harassment of government officials were rooted in racist motives, and 
the Southern Justice Institute sought to expose those involved who were making false 
accusations. The actions of the firm and its lawyers had an impact that lasted far beyond the civil 
rights era. Beginning in 1987, the FBI launched an investigation that brought an extensive 
amount of resources to bear, in order to find any information on possible illegal efforts of elected 
officials in Winston-Salem. In the summer of 1991, four elected officials and business people 
were wrongfully charged with various crimes ranging from perjury, conspiracy, mail fraud, and 
laundering (Background on the Case of the Winston-Salem Four n.d.). Coincidentally, the 
witnesses were comprised of white male businessmen and an undercover FBI agent. Rodney 
Sumler, Larry Womble, Patrick Hairston, and Reverend Lee Faye Mack were victims of the false 
allegations. The investigation was referred to as “Operation Mushroom Cloud,” and was initiated 
by a white male. These victims, all prominent members of society, were coined as the “Winston-
Salem Four.” Rodney Sumler was a political consultant and a lobbyist for the community. Larry 
Womble was a member of the Winston-Salem Board of Education and a founder of the N.C. 
Black Elected Municipal Officials. Patrick Hairston was known for his activism and also his 
participation in the NAACP. Lastly, Reverend Lee Faye Mack was known for her community 
activism, and was “highly respected for her outspoken advocacy and action on behalf of the most 
downtrodden members of the community” (Background on the Case of the Winston-Salem Four 
n.d.). 
The Southern Justice Institute was aware that more than just litigation was required to make 
progress in this case. Reverend Mack was represented by both Lewis Pitts of the Southern Justice 
Institute and Gregory Davis, a lawyer in Winston-Salem. Mack had a large community support 
system that knew these accusations were incorrect based on her years of public service and 
dedication to the community. Additionally, Mack’s case was especially unique because, during 
the trial in 1992, the government dropped the racketeering and corruption counts with which she 
had previously been charged. The judge ordered that she be tried separately from Sumler, 
Womble, and Hairston on two remaining counts when their trial was over (Background on the 
Case of the Winston-Salem Four n.d.). The only two remaining counts for Mack were those of 
conspiracy to obstruct and perjury, and this is where the Southern Justice Institute worked to 
represent Reverend Mack (Folder – Harassment of Black Elected Officials (Charges) n.d.). It 
was noted by the government that all of the previously mentioned counts were dropped because 
there was not enough evidence to back up the charges. The other three accused were represented 
by different lawyers, but they were connected through the counts for which they were charged. 
In addition to Mack’s counts that were dropped, the government also dropped all gambling 
charges for the remaining three officials, admitting that there was not the evidence required to 
back up the charges, “an admission that the government never had the right to bring those 
charges in the first place” (Background on the Case of the Winston-Salem Four n.d.). This 
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admission marked the beginning of the government’s loss of credibility, even though there was 
little evidence from the start – to the point that even the case’s prosecutor claimed there was 
nothing that proved any guilt on the part of the officials. The case of Reverend Mack was 
significant for many reasons, as were the cases of the other government officials, but the 
involvement of Pitts in Mack’s case was one of the most striking components. 
With Reverend Mack’s case being tried separately, Pitts and Davis also received assistance 
from Gayle Korotkin. Gayle was another lawyer from the Southern Justice Institute who was 
determined to fight on Mack’s behalf for the justice she deserved (Christic Institute-South n.d.). 
However, during the trial, Korotkin and Pitts received a scornful letter from Davis with regard to 
a newsletter released by the Southern Justice Institute. The newsletter updated followers of the 
firm on ongoing or completed cases and other events the firm was involved with, along with 
sections that dealt with social issues. Davis’s letter expresses his frustration with the firm and 
their stance on the case, which he extracted from the newsletter. The newsletter included 
commentary that illustrated the firm’s contempt for the government and its racially motivated 
prosecution, along with the cowardly actions of the lawyers prosecuting Reverend Mack (Davis 
1992). Davis continues on, expressing his belief that taking this bold approach was the incorrect 
strategy, and his unwillingness to move forward in the case with the assistance of the Southern 
Justice Institute because of the comments in the newsletter. Additionally, Davis expressed that, 
while this strategy may have appealed to some of Mack’s supporters who were certain of her 
innocence, this was not how he wished to pursue the case. This resulted in him giving the 
ultimatum that either he or the other lawyers had to withdraw as Reverend Mack’s representation 
(Davis 1992). In response, Pitts and Korotkin explained their confidence in the Reverend Mack’s 
case receiving a reversal, due to the denial of cross-examination and the lack of materiality 
presented by the opposing side. One of the closing sentences of the letter that can be assumed to 
be written by Pitts, in which the two announce their withdrawal from the case for the best interest 
of the client, states: “I assume the Judge will jump with joy over our departure – unless he wants 
to cause hardship for us” (Pitts and Korotkin 1992). This sentence highlights Pitts’ acceptance of 
the legal system’s almost antagonistic attitude concerning his advocacy for justice in this case 
and his disgust over the system as a whole. 
 
Lewis Pitts as Activist 
The reaction of Lewis Pitts as he and Korotkin were withdrawing from Reverend Mack’s case 
accurately depicts a recurring theme of his insight on the dynamics of lawyers and the legal 
system altogether. As he was the director of the Southern Justice Institute, his beliefs and actions, 
which were oriented around helping a larger cause, were representative of the firm and its 
motives. Due to his devotion to children’s rights during his time at the Southern Justice Institute, 
he accepted the position of Legal Director for the National Committee for the Rights of the Child 
in the mid-1990s. Even at this time, his opposition to the behavior of lawyers was apparent. In a 
letter asking for a grant from none other than Bill Gates himself, Pitts states, “I do not think well 
of lawyers as a whole; they lack courage to stand up to the Power Structure and routinely ignore 
the ethical principles in the Rules of Professional Conduct which state, among other things, that 
we as lawyers have a ‘special responsibility for the quality of justice’ in our nation” (Pitts 1993). 
This seemingly small comment was not the first time Pitts had openly expressed his hesitance 
around the legitimacy of the legal system, and would certainly not be the last. Additionally, his 
commitment to providing justice for those he felt deserving of it is illustrated when he reiterates 
in the letter to Mr. Gates that he made less than legal service wages in his twenty years of being a 
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lawyer, a clear indication that he was not invested in the institute for his own personal gain (Pitts 
1993). This supports the argument that, as an activist, his main priority was to fight for equality 
in all realms of life. His involvement in civil rights and passion for bringing others justice did not 
solely take place in the legal sector, and his distaste for lawyers acting unethically did not abate. 
The work of Lewis Pitts is commendable for many reasons, but it is his mistrust of the legal 
system and its processes that make him a unique lawyer and activist dedicated to providing 
justice. Purposefully choosing to resign from the Bar in 2014, as opposed to simply retiring his 
membership, Pitts was adamant about completely withdrawing from the system. His feelings on 
this decision were reflected in his letter of resignation, where he stated that being inactive would 
mean that he would still abide by the rules of the Bar. He stated, “my resignation is because I see 
an overall breach by the Bar as a whole of the most basic notions of professional conduct and 
ethics such that I do not want to be associated with the Bar” (Pitts 2016). The breaches that he 
goes on to address in detail go against the very qualities of justice and equality that the Bar vows 
to uphold and provide, and Pitts suggests that these qualities are only sought in the system when 
those in power are able to benefit. He also attributes many unethical practices within the system 
as stemming from the norm of profits outweighing the importance of bringing justice. Moreover, 
Pitts believes the system has turned into a market where “the quality of legal representation on 
either the criminal or civil side depends on the amount of money one has. What a travesty: 
millions of people desperately need legal representation while there are a flood of lawyers who 
cannot find work such that bar associations discuss the crisis of too many law schools” (Pitts 
2016). This emphasizes, from an intimate perspective, his strong feelings for others and also 
speaks to his advocacy during his time working with the Southern Justice Institute. 
 
Julius Chambers as Activist 
Pitts is just one of many lawyers who faced oppression due to his stance on racial injustices and 
other controversial social issues. Julius Chambers, a lawyer in Charlotte, North Carolina, was 
unique in his many accomplishments as a black lawyer during and after the civil rights era. His 
involvement in many desegregation and discrimination cases earned him respect in the 
courtroom, even though some were against his advancement and would often attempt to thwart 
his progress in cases. Ignoring the many acts of terror involving bombings and fires inflicted on 
Chambers, his family, and his firm, his largest opposition could be viewed as his fellow lawyers 
and judges within the courts. In several cases, Chambers had a clear victory in sight due to the 
obvious discrimination exhibited by the defendants, until those within the court system attempted 
to impede his success. For example, Chambers was deliberately denied a fair trial in Wooten vs. 
Moore [1969], a discrimination case. In this case, a restaurant wished to not serve blacks in New 
Bern and was managing to avoid being made to do so because of a business loophole. During the 
case, judicial ethics were ignored and Chambers was conspired against by Moore’s lawyer, who 
discussed his case with the judge outside of the courtroom (Mosnier and Rosen 2016, 110). This 
blatant disrespect for Chambers and his clients reflects the overall attitude of many bar members, 
and the superiority that these members believed to possess over Chambers and the black 
community. 
In another instance where Chambers filed a complaint against the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA), the YMCA locations in Charlotte and Raleigh both appeared to ignore the 
Civil Rights Act [1964] with regard to discrimination. These locations were both determined to 
keep some parts of the organization segregated and unavailable to blacks. Chambers quickly 
forced the Charlotte location to reverse their decision by filing a lawsuit. However, the Raleigh 
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YMCA would attempt to make concessions to the black community in various ways that could 
avoid their objections to seemingly concealed racist motives. This case became known as 
NeSmith v. YMCA of Raleigh [1967] (Mosnier and Rosen 2016, 119). The case was eventually 
ruled in Chamber’s favor when it reached an upper-level court upon appeal, but not before the 
appearance of racial bias in the courtroom when a judge initially ruled in favor of the YMCA 
(Mosnier and Rosen 2016, 105). To be in favor of the YMCA in this instance represents a clear 
disdain for the Civil Rights Act [1964] and its implications. The judges in these cases only 
illustrate some of the obstacles faced by Chambers, but with his dedication to his clients and the 
cause, he was able to overcome them and bring justice to the black community. With these cases, 
Chambers became a crucial activist for blacks in the area during the civil rights period, and set an 
important precedent that does not accept any loopholes and that demands equality without 
businesses being able to intervene on technicalities. 
Lawyers during the civil rights era were effective in the judicial arena, but their activism 
outside of the courtroom offered a holistic support system for the cause. Lewis Pitts and Julius 
Chambers can certainly qualify as activists for their tireless efforts to change the system, as 
opposed to lawyers who worked for their own economic benefit, as Pitts suggested. Another 
lawyer connected to Lewis Pitts, and who greatly supported equality during this era, was Alan 
McSurely. An attorney from Washington D.C., he and his wife dedicated a home in Carrboro, 
North Carolina, funded through the winnings of a prior case, where action-oriented groups could 
meet. The Southern Justice Institute was among these groups, which eventually led to the close 
relationship between Pitts and McSurely. In commenting on the generous donation provided by 
him and his wife, McSurely said, “we’re just trying to see if we can’t help organizations that are 
doing good work” (Trincia 1987). This act of recycling funds back into a cause that McSurely 
felt was essential to the fight for civil rights depicts true activism at work, and steps such as this 
are necessary for the advancement of certain groups. 
 
Lawyers and Activists 
Many practicing lawyers during the civil rights era can collectively be assumed to have benefited 
the black community as a whole. However, the goals of lawyers and activists do not often 
overlap, as they have varying approaches and motives in certain cases. Speaking of this, Leroy 
Clark stated: “the lawyers understandably thought of ‘winning’ cases; the activists did not care if 
a case was ‘lost’ if the movement was advanced. The lawyers had experienced a progressive 
series of court victories and did not see the law as ultimately antagonistic to social change. The 
activists had known jails, beatings, and coercion – even when their cases were ‘won’” (Clark 
1970, 465). This stark contrast is the main difference that separates the two, and there would be 
some situations where these actors would remain on completely different spectrums for the goals 
they strived to reach. Even lawyers and activists who had the same goals could have different 
action plans for implementing justice, such as in the case of Reverend Mack. As discussed, Davis 
criticized Pitts and the Southern Justice Institute for their activism and the radical approach used 
in their newsletter to draw attention to the racial bias presented by the government in their 
inaccurate and unsupported claims (Davis 1992).  
Regardless of the disconnect that may occur between lawyers and activists, the combined 
effort of these groups is required in order to fulfill the needs of community members struggling 
to obtain their rights. Activists are important for they voice their opinion on injustices, while 
lawyers must then bring attention to these issues and demand a change. Also, Clark argues that 
“on a day-to-day basis a civil rights lawyer was crucial to the momentum of direct-action 
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techniques, for he devised ways to quickly secure the release of demonstrators from jail so that 
they could continue demonstrating and keep the political and moral pressures on” (1970, 465). 
This emphasizes the imperative role of lawyers in this time, even if they were not considered 
activists.  
Lewis Pitts, Julius Chambers, and Alan McSurely undoubtedly proved their activist status 
through their many years of hard work and commitment to the cause. The involvement of these 
lawyers in the community and in nationwide struggles brought much legitimacy to their firm in 
their unified fight to better the community and provide social, economic, and racial equality. 
Their assistance in this struggle from a legal perspective is admired and appreciated from an 
activist’s viewpoint, but this also begs the question: exactly how much did their participation in 
the civil rights movement really help? 
 
Conclusion 
Lawyers are presented with the ability to alter a system slightly when there is an injustice, but to 
what extent they are able to change the system is questionable. The unique and recurring concept 
of preservation-through-transformation was introduced by Reva Siegal and can be attributed to 
the efforts of many lawyers during the civil rights period. This idea describes the process of 
status hierarchies being perpetuated through legal reform over the years because the change that 
occurs is not enough to bring about a structural change. For example, though there has been 
significant progress in the advancement of women’s rights and in the past 100 years, the social 
hierarchy has not altered much. John Calmore mentioned in regard to this theory that “legal 
changes have been significant, at least in formal senses, and those changes have produced real 
progress in improving the lives of people. Yet, because the legal changes have not gone far 
enough, have not been sustainable enough to resist backlash and retrenchment, those changes 
have not been fully transformative” (Calmore 2004, 620–21). So, how permanent were the 
changes brought upon by the lawyers and the legal system during the civil rights era?  
Though well-intentioned, the efforts of many lawyers during the period discussed in this 
article were clearly temporary and insufficient as racial and even gender injustices are still 
exhibited in society. Herein lies the primary reason why the role of activists proved to be so 
necessary for the period due to their calls for a change in the system, and why they can today be 
perceived as equally essential. Lawyers can publicize issues in their cases when fighting for 
justice and potentially bring justice to their client, but this is not necessarily an act of calling for 
reform in the structure of hierarchies. Calmore speaks about this from a lawyer’s perspective: 
“sometimes, we have a tendency to focus too narrowly on the legal issue and, consequently, law 
reform efforts are reduced to stopgap or, increasingly, hold-harmless measures” (2004, 621). A 
transformation that has deeper roots in a broader change – as opposed to a focus on specific 
cases or situations – is required to see a genuine, permanent difference, which is what Pitts, 
Chambers, and McSurely exhibited through their activism.  
The Southern Justice Institute was able to be so well known for its political activism because 
of its lawyers and the support it received. Its origins allowed it to develop above and beyond 
what could have been expected of a public interest law firm. The lawyers and the board members 
provided a solid background for the institution and proved their commitment in their time at the 
firm. The infamous case of Reverend Mack that was prompted by racial incentives exemplified 
the willingness of the Southern Justice Institute to risk withdrawing from a case in order to 
publicize all that was unjust about it, demonstrating what was of true importance to Pitts and the 
Southern Justice Institute. Lewis Pitts and Julius Chambers knew the consequences they would 
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face when they took on the positions of both lawyer and activist in working to ensure civil rights 
for the community, and they were not willing to back down or hesitate in this fight. They wanted 
to do whatever was necessary to bring social change, and not just keep their clients happy by 
winning certain cases – assuming the role of activist while being a lawyer came second. Such 
lawyers were trying to do more than the bare minimum, and, contrary to Pitts’ idea of lawyers, 
were not concerned with appealing to those in a higher position of power.  
Social justice and equality for all were the primary, driving factors for these lawyers, and the 
standing of lawyers in this particular social construct allowed them to use their power and status 
to provide a more substantive support system for certain movements. The readiness of the firm to 
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Women’s Works: The Evolution of Tanzanian Women’s Movements from 






Gender has become an important area of increased focus in discourses on human rights and 
development over the last thirty years, but unfortunately that focus has primarily been on liberal 
approaches to gender as mediated through international organizations. The history of Tanzania 
offers an opportunity for more expansive scholarly interrogations of gender within political 
action in Africa. In particular, the evolution of women’s movements in Tanzania from the early 
independence era to post-structural adjustment is instructive for understanding the potential of 
non-elite women’s subaltern mass movements and the limitations of liberal institutionalism. This 
article examines that evolution, tracing these movements after first identifying theoretical entry 
points that allow for a better understanding of the work of Tanzanian non-elite women. 




The increasing prevalence of feminist gendered discourses within international governance 
bodies is one of the most important developments of the past thirty years. Unfortunately, the 
increasing utilization of gendered analysis has been siloed. Discreet aspects of policy around 
political liberation and economic development have been reformed in the name of gender equity, 
but larger areas of sustained gender-conscious justice have yet to be integrated into global 
economic and political systems. Indeed, gendered reforms are often explicitly liberal and 
singular, like gender quotas for state parliaments, or ill defined, like the vague but popular goal 
of women’s “empowerment.” These efforts are not without impact, but they are rarely intended 
to fundamentally alter larger social realities. As a result, non-elite women continue to be 
disproportionately politically marginalized, despite policy modifications supposedly intended to 
create equality. In African contexts, this global reality has been exacerbated by a history of 
colonial looting predicated on creating poverty and ignoring grassroots desires that extends into 
the present day. 
Ensuring that the needs of African non-elite women are met through future policy reform 
requires more than a reworking of Western discourses and institutions. A truly egalitarian project 
of gendered reform requires drawing on the work of non-elite women in specific and historicized 
African contexts. The case of Tanzanian non-elite women in the second half of the twentieth 
century is particularly generative, given the centrality of both women and egalitarianism in 
Tanzanian politics and the post-independence state. Comparing the political contributions of 
Tanzanian non-elite women during the anti-colonial independence movement to women’s 
movements working in the ongoing aftermath of structural adjustment demonstrates both the 
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potential of feminist discourses that explicitly consider class as a gendered concern within 
development and the limitations of gender advocacy movements that fail to fundamentally alter 
systems of poverty. This article attempts to serve as an entry point to that comparison by 
identifying theoretical frames for best understanding the work of Tanzanian non-elite women, 
evaluating the structure and impacts of movements in both eras, and suggesting a path forward 
for similar scholarly work. 
 
Prioritizing the Knowledge of Tanzanian Women 
Before examining the local and global implications of Tanzania’s history, it is useful to first 
acknowledge the theoretical constraints of this article. While this research primarily looks at the 
work of non-elite women, it is not possible to ascribe a singular experience to non-elite women 
at any point in Tanzania’s history. So, the most effective pathway to understanding their 
movements is to recognize the concerns and actions they mobilized around. This methodology 
precludes mapping the experience of European or Western women’s movements onto the 
experiences of Tanzanian women, as the experiences of non-elite women in Tanzania are not 
necessarily analogous to those of women in other contexts. Scholarship on their work should not 
default to presuming a singular experience of womanhood. Although some aspects of patriarchy 
in Tanzania require external critique, it is important not to assume that patriarchy is universal or 
that prominent external representatives of powerful feminisms have greater relevance in feminist 
debates than local actors. As a foundational work on the colonizing impacts of academic 
feminism, Chandra Mohanty’s seminal article “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses” is particularly useful for framing this conversation. As Mohanty (1988) 
suggests, essentializing analysis only reinforces neocolonial norms of knowledge production and 
undermines the goal of allowing for autonomy among non-elite African women. In fact, at varied 
moments in the historical arc of women’s movements in Tanzania, the efforts of non-elite 
women have run directly counter to dominant Western feminisms that emerged in response to 
European and American forms of patriarchy. 
In order to avoid the prioritization of hegemonic external opinions, it is powerful to 
acknowledge the women involved with specific movements as the primary experts on the value 
of those movements, embracing them as organic intellectuals, following Gramsci (Zompetti 
1997). Gramsci’s model notes that cultural and political knowledge are created and embodied 
across class, race, and gender hierarchies, and that those individuals closest to the embodiment of 
any group’s particular reality have a unique understanding of that reality, and, by extension, a 
knowledge of movements that can change their lived experiences (Zompetti 1997). This 
approach is valuable in the case of Tanzanian women’s movements for a number of reasons, not 
least of which is because it is instructive on how to handle global contestations of the label of 
woman. It might be valuable to question the particular value of womanhood as an identity given 
its connection to essentialized binaries of sex. However, such an interrogation should not take 
priority in the case of Tanzania given the wide popularity of womanhood as an identity with 
significant meaning shared by women in both internal and external liberation struggles. 
Similarly, while the power of singular feminized motifs like motherhood has been critically 
interpreted by scholars such as Carole Pateman (2005), the limitations and efficacy of such 
motifs receive little attention here given their productive use in examining Tanzania. 
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The Possibility of Letting the Experiences of Non-Elite Women Speak 
An intention to think and write through a decolonized lens does not inherently lead to effective 
execution of decolonial scholarship. The legacy of Western movements like Marxism or the 
Enlightenment cannot be simply waved away as if ignoring them dispels their relevance or 
prevalence. As a result, the arguments that follow are still framed within an academic set of 
norms that prioritizes the voices of specifically credentialed individuals who are given the bulk 
of unevenly divided resources. Given this structural limitation, it is important not to build 
scholarship on Tanzanian women’s movements in a way that further limits the capacity for the 
experiences of non-elite women to be heard. In the face of dominant discourses, the non-elite 
women of Tanzania are particularly susceptible to erasure. At the intersection of African, black 
and brown, women, and poor identities, the communities that comprise Tanzania’s non-elite 
classes are antithetical to the hegemonic value systems that organize global economic and social 
value. By the very nature of their exclusion, they represent the global apotheosis of another 
Gramiscian idea that Gayatri Spivak (2010), among others, has widely expanded – the subaltern. 
Defined simply, the subaltern are those members of society who are marginalized and silenced 
by hegemonic values. 
As Spivak (2010) argues, it is nearly impossible to represent subaltern voices or interests 
since dominant existing methods of knowledge creation and representation are rooted in 
disregarding their needs and desires. This manifests as a scarcity of scholarship around 
Tanzanian women generally, and in an even greater absence of opinion polls, social histories, 
and political treatises geared toward understanding Tanzanian women peasants. Such absences 
make it difficult to examine the meaning of Tanzanian women’s actions, let alone interrogate the 
complicated nuances of race, kinship, and religion that further complicate their intent. Tanzania 
has consistently ranked as one of the twenty-five poorest nations in the world, so even 
comparatively middle-class women have lacked the ties to financial and political power that 
might classify them as elite in a comparative sense (Mtonga 1993). This means that, at least 
within the context of current study, the elite woman status in Tanzania is largely confined to 
those with unique access to wealth and education, whose contact with success and/or power has 
primarily stemmed from connections to patriarchal systems of control. As such, existing 
scholarship primarily excludes wealthy individuals who have operated outside grassroots 
movements. One such woman is Saira Dewji, whose complicity in extractive economies has 
done little to add to gendered attempts at political change (Pederson and Kwek 2017). Similarly, 
less attention is paid to liberal discourses that have already been deeply interrogated, like 
legislative gender quotas, which have helped to elevate well-connected women into the halls of 
power, but have done little to reshape the actual nature of those same halls. Naming these 
scholarly restrictions amplifies those activists and methods most closely aligned with or tied to 
the actual development of non-elite Tanzanian women. Attempting to demonstrate the lessons of 
Tanzanian subaltern women for the larger context of gendered liberation policies in Africa would 
not be effective, or perhaps even possible, without understanding that the most important women 
involved come from the subaltern. 
 
Independence-Era Tanzania as an Exceptional Case for Women 
With those intellectual preconditions established, it is possible to examine the successes of non-
elite women in building political power during the early political creation of an independent 
Tanzania. Starting in the mid-1950s and continuing through the early 1960s, non-elite women 
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helped create an early vision of Tanzania (then Tanganyika) as a radically egalitarian state, and 
coordinated networks of political and social collaboration for subaltern women that shaped the 
future of Tanzanian policy. With that early push, and perhaps more than in any other early post-
colonial African state, poor and marginalized women directed the actual priorities of the 
independence movement, and the newly-created state rewarded them with universalized public 
goods like education and healthcare. Support for gender justice, or at least a greater degree of 
gender equity, was advanced through the power of a new politics of liberation and shared 
networks of organic political participation. 
In some scholarship, this gendered success is attributed to the radical and inclusive vision of 
Julius Nyerere, the most prominent pro-independence leader in colonial Tanganyika and the 
independent nation’s first president (Ladner 1971). He espoused Ujamaa – an influential political 
theory of specifically African socialism that roughly translates from Swahili to “familyhood” and 
includes a comparatively enlightened understanding of women as equally valuable to men, if in 
compatible roles rather than integrated ones. This helped set the tone for the inclusion of poor 
and socially marginalized women in Tanzanian politics (Lal 2010). However, this was not a 
spontaneously offered gift of power and enfranchisement given to powerless masses out of pity. 
Nyerere’s personal politics certainly made him receptive to poor women’s inclusion in the 
advocacy and actions of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), but it was the pre-
existing acuity and determination of subaltern women that made it necessary for him to act on his 
most inclusive impulses. 
As Susan Geiger has documented, in these early days, Nyerere was himself taught by a 
variety of women about the importance of gender equity, African specificity, and emancipatory 
politics (Geiger 1996). Their input carried weight both because of the limitations of Nyerere’s 
own personal context, and because of the power that the sheer number of Tanzanian women 
carried as a collective. While Nyerere, possessing a Scottish graduate degree, was the most 
educated person in Tanzania and the lineal son of the chief of his local kinship network, it was 
not solely his social standing that granted him primacy among early Tanzanian leaders (Bjerk 
2017, 41). The popularity of his well-articulated belief in a post-colonial system that would 
distribute prosperity more fairly, but avoid solely relying on the external ideology of Leninism, 
probably played a larger role in his pre-independence ascendance and certainly in his post-
independence popularity. This politics of socialism might seem to avoid the explicit question of 
gender, but it was actually especially dependent on the thoughts and needs of poor women. 
Material needs require poor Tanzanian women to labor, and, in Nyerere’s conceptualization of 
Ujamaa, society would reflect the industrious norms of poor women rather than the apathy of 
elite women (Nyerere 1968). 
Further, Nyerere’s experience of comparative privilege isolated him from some of the 
impacts of gendered coloniality, but the extensive contributions of women helped ensure that his 
emancipatory politics did not fall into the rigidly exclusionary sexism of other African leaders 
like Leopold Senghor (Eko 1986). It was also after conversations with women who were 
politically marginalized by chiefs when they attempted to attend TANU meetings and women 
who led recruitment tours that Nyerere actually began to shape more aggressive recruitment 
plans for TANU (Geiger 1982). In his words, “women who live in the villages work harder than 
anybody else in Tanzania” (Nyerere 1968). The claim of one prominent woman leader that it was 
she who had to teach Nyerere Swahili as an adult was likely a vast overstatement, but it speaks to 
the larger role that Tanzanian women played on an interpersonal level, using their experiences to 
shape responsive leaders (Geiger 1996). Women without traditional social power thus fostered 
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the roots of Tanzania’s earliest national political reality. They were not simply relegated to 
advisory positions though. Non-elite women were also able to assume positions of leadership and 
power, contradictory though this might seem in light of their status as subaltern. 
 
The Roles of Non-Elite Women 
Bibi Titi Mohammed is undoubtedly the most famous of the non-elite women political leaders, 
and, after an unfortunate period of scholarly neglect, her impact on the success of independence 
is now often cited. Her independent contributions are worth noting, but she also more broadly 
represents a certain kind of non-elite woman leader in Tanzania who effectively shaped greater 
gender equity through grassroots organizing. In 1955, Titi Mohammed was a working member of 
a dance and music group in Dar es Salaam (Geiger 1982). She was sporadically involved with 
the early movement. However, when a colonial administrator came to Tanzania and asked to 
meet with the head of TANU’s women’s auxiliary, an organization that did not exist, Titi 
Mohammed filled the imaginary role (Geiger 1987). This quickly escalated into her founding and 
leading an early version of a TANU women’s organization, recruiting 5,000 members in under 3 
months. Under Bibi Titi Mohammed’s leadership, the group was not a passive women’s 
auxiliary, like earlier local elite social clubs that discussed knitting and small-scale charity work 
(Geiger 1987). To the contrary, it was in some ways the foremost engine of independence. 
Unlike in Kenya, the Tanzanian push for independence involved little violent conflict, so the 
hierarchical and masculine trappings of militarization were not a barrier to entry for women 
(Geiger 1987). Even more importantly, because of gendered assumptions around roles, women 
of the colonial era were better positioned than men to organize support for independence through 
events like concerts, rallies, and meetings. 
Using preexisting social spaces like dance halls and family homes, Bibi Titi Mohammed 
helped create a network of women leaders who spread TANU’s vision of egalitarian 
independence across the country (Geiger 1987). These women were not rich socialites, but rather 
working-class fish mongers, fruit merchants, and beer brewers. Bibi Titi Mohammed herself was 
Muslim – part of a religious community purposefully disenfranchised by colonial administrators 
– as well as illiterate (Geiger 1996). At the same time that she coordinated the birth of Tanzania 
through her barnstorming cross-country advocacy, she still worked as a music leader. Her 
working spirit fueled the movement and demonstrated the dedication of working women to the 
cause of independence. She represented the localized woman leaders, who ranged in age from 17 
to their 80s, across the country (Geiger 1996). These women were active in the movement 
because they believed independence would bring greater justice, and because there seemed to be 
no other way to demand the education, enfranchisement, and political autonomy that most of 
them craved. 
 
The Roles of Elite Women 
The prevalence of working-class women leaders did not completely preclude elite women from 
holding positions of power, but it did shape how those elite women approached their 
accountability to womanhood as a political identity and the roles available to them. In many 
young independent African nations, local elites parlayed the vacuum left by colonial powers into 
personal riches. Elite women, particularly the collaborating African quasi-gentry, benefited 
enormously from this exploitation of power, and, as such, even when they supported policies that 
challenged gender inequities, they were often limited in their advocacy as they prioritized class 
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exploitation over gendered liberation. This resulted in meaningful, but very limited, gains like 
finishing schools for young girls. In postcolonial Tanzania, this was far less frequently the case, 
and elite women leaders were usually the most committed allies of working-class women. 
Two women emblematic of this allyship were Lucy Lameck, an Oxford-educated daughter of 
a politically influential Christian family, and Lady Marion Chesham, a white American-British 
expat whose husband had been a wealthy landowner (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). 
Alongside Titi Mohammed, both Lameck and Chesham served in the first post-independence 
session of the Tanzanian legislative assembly in 1962, and tirelessly advocated for poor women 
as members of parliament through to 1975 and 1972, respectively. Both women used their 
legislative roles to support Titi Mohammed as a voice for working women in matters as serious 
as the provision of equal parental status for women, and as mundane as rebuking a male member 
of parliament who insinuated that poor young women were destroying the social welfare of 
Tanzania with their covertly sexual dancing (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). Lucy Lameck 
supplemented this commitment in her cabinet role as Parliamentary Secretary of Cooperatives 
and Community Development, where she helped ensure that Tanzania’s development policies 
benefited the rural poor. In total, she led programs that expanded new craft and agricultural skills 
to over 100,000 women (Jellicoe 1962). 
Similarly, outside of her legislative duties, Lady Chesham helped found the Community 
Development Trust Fund (CDTF), which funneled external aid to internal development projects 
in Tanzania (Black 1992, 146). During Chesham’s tenure, the CDTF encouraged projects 
targeted at eliminating burdens for poor women, based on the idea that women would be the 
driving force behind community development if they were given knowledge, time, and 
opportunity – a premise that was a radical approach to development aid at the time. After she 
stepped down, Chesham passed leadership of the agency to a working-class Tanzanian woman 
named Martha Bulengo (Black 1992, 146–48). This type of early leadership of poor women 
encouraged their elite counterparts to prioritize the needs of poor women in gender equity 
advocacy, and also stymied the class divisions that limited the efficacy of female political figures 
elsewhere. This contributed to stronger political coalitions around the identity of womanhood, 
and helped expand access to social services like education, health care, and agricultural training, 
which was limited by class or gender in comparable contexts. 
 
The Impact of these Early Women’s Movements 
The wide scope of the contributions of poor Tanzanian women resulted in both the kind of 
prescriptive representation now widely celebrated in liberalized contexts, and more broadly 
beneficial reforms like the expansion of more equal educational opportunities that erased racial 
segregation (Lewis et al. 1962, 34). By the time independence was actually achieved in 1961, 
Bibi Titi Mohammed was described as the second most popular and well-known politician in 
Tanzania (Geiger 1996). By 1955, women had constituted most of TANU’s registered 
membership and poor women made up the vast majority (Geiger 1996). Many of the women 
involved in the independence movement had joined in part because the party promised an 
expansion of education, and, eventually, an expansion of accessible health options – promises 
that were partially fulfilled. 
Women constituted an undeniable part of the body politic, and gendered advocacy was 
embedded in the fiber of the country’s egalitarian politics. In many other newly postcolonial 
contexts, singular women who helped build independence movements were often uninterested in 
broad reforms that benefited the majority of women. Thus, the above successes, while impressive 
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on their own, are even more surprising given the external pressure to marginalize poor women. 
In the case of education, for example, the very first relevant UNESCO reports actually suggested 
reducing investment in women’s education, a request the Tanzanian state ignored (Lewis et al. 
1962, 54). This early context suggests some important lessons for modern gendered movements. 
Central to the success of Tanzanian women’s success were specific policy asks, a connection to 
the larger ideology of equality, explicit acknowledgement of gender, and open democratic 
organizing led by non-elites. In coordination, these made the contribution of the early women’s 
movement particularly effective. Nevertheless, there were obvious limitations. The upper 
echelons of leadership remained primarily in the hands of men and the political arena remained 
frustratingly androcentric. More broadly relevant to poor women, their concerns around land 
rights and protection from domestic violence were largely ignored for the time being. In a sense, 
these early successes were meant to hold a promise of continued reforms. Unfortunately, that 
promise later went partially unfulfilled. 
 
The Decline and Inflection Point of Early Women’s Movements in Tanzania 
If the political action of working-class Tanzanian women during the independence movement 
was rooted in optimism about the possibility of socialist class politics, then the growth of 
women’s movements after structural adjustment was at least partly imagined as a response to the 
failures of the utopian Ujamaa vision. After maintaining relative political stability for most of the 
1960s, the Tanzanian government started rapidly accelerating their commitment to radical 
socialism in 1967 (Nyerere 1968). The expanded implementation of Ujamaa continued 
throughout the 1970s. In many instances, Ujamaa drastically improved measurements of human 
welfare like literacy and gender parity in primary schools, but these benefits were somewhat 
offset by a villagization scheme that coercively relocated over 4 million people (Scott 1998, 
223). The expansion of the state greatly benefited social welfare projects, but also limited space 
for dissent. Non-elite women sat at the crux of these contradictions. Under Ujamaa, many of the 
aims of women’s movements around education, employment, and political equality were met 
(Scott 1998, 223). However, during the same period, the political power of the women’s 
organization was largely undermined, and most prominent women leaders were removed from 
official office for various reasons, including the charges of treason that would functionally exile 
Bibi Titi Mohammed from public life (Geiger 1996). 
The uncomfortable balance between increasing human welfare for women and decreasing 
political space for women’s voices was not the low point for Tanzanian women’s movements. 
The nadir emerged as the larger project of Ujamaa began to collapse. Starting in the late 1970s, a 
war with Uganda, growing national debt, and the global oil crisis pushed the Tanzanian economy 
into collapse. By 1985, Nyerere had resigned, and by 1986, the Tanzanian government had 
signed an agreement with the IMF that implemented neoliberal austerity across the board 
(Hodgson 2002). At this point, women’s potential for political power became more limited, due 
to the increased domination of international neoliberal reforms within Tanzanian politics; at the 
same time, those same policies undermined the human welfare programs that had benefited poor 
women in the past. The breakage created space for new kinds of movements. After the 
implementation of structural adjustment, women’s movements in Tanzania followed the global 
trend toward NGO-ification with mixed results. Non-elite women increasingly benefited from 
organizations that catered to needs the state had previously ignored, but were also generally 
harmed by the reduction of direct governmental accountability (Badri and Tripp 2017). 
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Successes and Failures of Post-Structural Adjustment Women’s Movements  
Several particularly notable organizations focused on women’s advocacy grew out of a 
blossoming moment for Tanzanian NGOs, including national groups Tanzania Gender 
Networking Programme (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) (Badri 
and Tripp 2017). In the growing space for dissent in the 1990s, both organizations saw an 
opportunity to combat remaining gendered inequalities and injustices that had gone ignored 
under the politics of Ujamaa. Leaders at TAMWA have since described their organization as 
having psychologically rejected dependency on state reform to embrace the gender-oriented 
development and social change that flourished under Ujamaa (Badri and Tripp 2017). Building 
from this approach of external activism and international events like the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in 1995 which resulted in the Beijing Declaration, both organizations 
have experienced meaningful success in advocating for political reforms that create legal 
protections for women’s equality, such as the Laws of Marriage Act and Village Land Act of 
1999, which codified that customary practice could not be utilized to deny women the ability to 
own land (Badri and Tripp 2017). TGNP, in particular, has boldly advocated for LGBTQ 
individuals, vastly expanding the gender purview of feminist organizing in Tanzania. Smaller 
NGOs have used similar approaches to advocate for the specific needs of disabled women and 
women from ethnic minorities like the Maasai (Hodgson 2002). Some scholars, like Ali Mari 
Tripp, have argued that this growth of gender-focused NGOs in Tanzania, and in Africa more 
broadly, represents an unprecedented opportunity for activists and organizers interested in 
advancing the social and civil rights for non-elite Tanzanian women (Tripp 2003). This approach 
understands the modern growth of NGOs that are interested in supporting women as a 
continuation of the work done by women during the independence movement. 
However, the success of these independent NGOs as replacements for a unified political 
movement of liberation grounded in gendered analysis should not be overestimated. As one 
example, the scholarly optimism of those such as Tripp (2003) ignores that the neoliberal 
political reality that enables the growth of NGOs is a rupture with the socialist politics that 
enabled past gendered advocacy. In the past, poor women in Tanzania were able to push for 
significant change because political organizing had few barriers to entry, which allowed them to 
reimagine their existing social connections as vectors for political engagement. In contrast, 
NGOs are funded through complex international financial structures that require technical skills 
like grant writing and bilingual or multilingual fluency, not to mention the more basic 
prerequisites like advanced literacy and numeracy. As a result, Tanzanian NGOs working on 
gender are unable to employ the poor women they advocate for and claim to represent. Working 
class women are effectively barred from participating in their own liberation. Tripp implicitly 
acknowledges this undemocratic reality when she lists modern faces of Tanzanian feminism and 
is only able to draw on elites like academics, consultants, and politicians (Badri and Tripp 2017). 
By the same token, Tripp describes poverty as the foremost issue facing Tanzanian women, but 
only a few of the legislative reforms she describes being passed are directly tied to combatting 
poverty in any substantial and structural way (Badri and Tripp 2017). 
These flaws in representation and legislation point to a larger failure. Fettered by their 
reliance on international donors, and unable to meaningfully appeal to any universal mandate, 
NGOs like TAMWA and TGNP lack the capacity to advocate for the kind of radical reforms that 
are most likely to change the systemic and continuing issue of poverty for women in Tanzania. 
The cost of structural adjustment has not only been political for poor women. By most human 
development metrics, women in Tanzania are worse off under the newly liberalized system than 
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they were under the socialism of the 1970s. In fact, structural adjustment programs generally 
tend to create significant inequality, which in turn exacerbates the marginalization of the poor 
(Babb 2005; Elson 1988; Gindling and Robbins 2001; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). In Tanzania, 
this has held true for everything from maternal health outcomes to education equity, leaving 
most metrics worse off than comparable measures from almost any point during Ujamaa 
(Lugalla 1995, 53). 
Unfortunately, the most recent developments in Tanzanian politics suggest that the strength 
of gender equity movements will continue to shrink. In recent years, the Tanzanian state has 
grown more authoritarian under President Magufuli, who was elected in 2015. Increasingly, 
individual consolidation of wealth has been encouraged and celebrated, corrupt resource 
extraction by foreign companies has become normalized at the highest levels of government, and 
dissent, even from journalists and intellectuals, is more dangerous than at most earlier moments 
in Tanzania’s history (Reuters 2017). This all leaves little room for new gendered political 
advocacy. TGNP, for example, has already experienced such significant backlash from its 
LGBTQ advocacy that it has had to reduce its public visibility. Without the widespread political 
support of peasant women, NGOs and activists will become even more susceptible to the 
coercive limitations of the state. In turn, the deteriorating social conditions of non-elite women 
will continue to unravel. President Magufuli’s recent decision to reverse existing policy norms 
and expel any school girls who become pregnant before graduating suggests that the legislative 
victories for women’s rights from the past few decades are at risk of vanishing as quickly as the 
social welfare successes of Ujamaa (Aglionby 2017). In this historical moment, Tanzania stands 
at the precipice of another possible radical shift in the structure of political organizing around the 
needs of non-elite women. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no inherent virtue in romanticizing Tanzania’s early post-colonial past. Bibi Titi 
Mohammed and Julius Nyerere are not mythical figures, and the political compromises of the 
early independence movement are not above criticism. It is not hard to see how the political 
marginalization of women under later Ujamaa represented a failure of the supposedly equality-
focused mandate of the country’s leaders. However, by the same token, it is also important not to 
undervalue the successes of the era. Since the early 2000s, it has become popular in development 
circles to celebrate Tanzania’s supposed recovery from economic collapse. While Tanzania’s 
economy has largely stabilized, it is important not to underestimate what was lost when the IMF 
used austerity to crush one of the most heterodox and revolutionary African governments of the 
twentieth century. Given the continuing futility of trying to solve gendered, racial, and 
geographic inequities as independent development problems, the work of subaltern women in 
shaping the Tanzanian state’s most effective politics and policies is a historical touchstone. The 
legalistic gender advocacy that has gained global dominance in the modern era is impressive, but 
in comparison to earlier Tanzanian liberation movements, it lacks a cohesive politics of systemic 
change. This is reflective of a broader failure among policy analysts to consider the factors of 
class and power in the implementation of feminist politics. 
In Tanzania, non-elite women’s early integration of gendered development norms into a 
larger politics of postcolonial freedom and egalitarian wealth distribution not only allowed them 
greater access to powerful movements of liberation, but also forced self-proclaimed ally 
communities, like elite women, to more radically address their needs in the long term. On a 
localized scale, this historical legacy of class and gender collaboration seems to be a uniquely 
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powerful tool for any attempt to resist authoritarian neoliberalism in Tanzania. On a global scale, 
policy makers and scholars need to use historical movements like those of pro-independence 
women in Tanzania to imagine and support new movements that center the needs of 
intersectionally marginalized groups, particularly at the nexus of class and gender. Committing 
to this class-conscious and gendered justice of solidarity is one part of reimagining the limited 






Aglionby, John. 2017. “Tanzania’s Enemies of the State: Pregnant Young Women.” Financial 
Times, October 11. https://www.ft.com/content/c7507730-712c-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9. 
Babb, Sarah. 2005. “The Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment: Recent Evidence and 
Current Debates.” Annual Review of Sociology 31: 199–222. 
Badri, Balghis, and Aili Mari Tripp, eds. 2017. Women's Activism in Africa: Struggles for Rights 
and Representation. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Bjerk, Paul. 2017. Julius Nyerere. Columbus: Ohio University Press. 
Black, Maggie. 1992. A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam – The First Fifty Years. Oxford: Oxfam 
Publications and Oxford University Press. 
Eko, Ebele. 1986. “Changes in the Image of the African Woman: A Celebration.” Phylon (1960-) 
47, no. 3: 210–18. 
Elson, Diane. 1987. “The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: Concepts and Issues.” 
University of Manchester, School of Economics, International Development Centre. 
Discussion Paper in Development Series (No. 232636): 1–37. https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/ 
record/232636/files/uman-dp-8801.pdf. 
Geiger, Susan. 1982. “Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania and the Needs of the Rural Poor.” 
African Studies Review 25, no. 2–3: 45–65. 
Geiger, Susan. 1987. “Women in Nationalist Struggle: Tanu Activists in Dar es Salaam.” The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 20, no. 1: 1–26. 
Geiger, Susan. 1996. “Tanganyikan Nationalism as ‘Women's Work’: Life Histories, Collective 
Biography and Changing Historiography.” The Journal of African History 37, no. 3: 465–78. 
Geiger, Susan. 1997. TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan 
Nationalism, 1955–1965. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann. 
Gindling, Tim H., and Donald Robbins. 2001. “Patterns and Sources of Changing Wage 
Inequality in Chile and Costa Rica During Structural Adjustment.” World Development 29, 
no. 4: 725–45. 
Hodgson, Dorothy L. 2002. “Precarious Alliances: The Cultural Politics and Structural 
Predicaments of the Indigenous Rights Movement in Tanzania.” American Anthropologist 
104, no. 4: 1086–97. 
Jellicoe, M.R. 1962. “Occasional Papers on Community Development.” East African Literature 
Bureau. Report. East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library. 
Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo. 2000. “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural 
Adjustment Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: The Case of Ghana.” The 
Professional Geographer 52, no. 3: 469–83. 
Peeples Evolution of Tanzanian Women’s Movements 
 
 31 
Ladner, Joyce. 1971. “Tanzanian Women and Nation Building.” The Black Scholar 3, no. 4: 22–
28. 
Lal, Priya. 2010. “Militants, Mothers, and the National Family: Ujamaa, Gender, and Rural 
Development in Postcolonial Tanzania.” The Journal of African History 51, no. 1: 1–20. 
Lewis, L.J, Hellen Coppen, A.J. Loveridge, Simon Pratt, I.P. Tretiakov, W. van der Wal, John 
Cameron, and I.J. Mhaiki. 1963. Report of UNESCO Educational Planning Mission For 
Tanganyika - (Mission) June to October 1962. 31 January. Dar es Salaam: UNESCO. 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000185020. 
Lugalla, Joe. 1995. “The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies on Women's and Children's 
Health in Tanzania.” Review of African Political Economy 22, no. 63: 43–53. 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1988. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses.” Feminist Review 30: 61–88. 
Mtonga, Harry L. 1993. “Comparing the Role of Education in Serving Socioeconomic and 
Political Development in Tanzania and Cuba.” Journal of Black Studies 23, no. 3: 382–402. 
Nyerere, Julius. 1968. The Arusha Declaration and Tanu’s Policy on Socialism and Self-
Reliance. Arusha: Tanzanian Ministry of Information and Tourism. 
Pateman, Carole. 2005. “Equality, Difference, and Subordination: The Politics of Motherhood 
and Women’s Citizenship.” In Beyond Equality and Difference, edited by Susan James and 
Gisela Bock, 22–35. New York: Routledge. 
Pedersen, Rasmus Hundsbæk, and Opportuna Kweka. 2017. “The Political Economy of 
Petroleum Investments and Land Acquisition Standards in Africa: The Case of Tanzania.” 
Resources Policy 52: 217–25. 
Reuters. 2017. “Tanzania's President Warns Journalists That Press Freedom Has Limits.” 
Reuters. March 24. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-media/tanzanias-president-
warns-journalists-that-press-freedom-has-limits-idUSKBN16V25S. 
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 2010. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In Can the Subaltern Speak? 
Reflections on the History of an Idea, edited by Rosalind C. Morris, 21–78. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Tripp, Aili Mari. 2003. “Women in Movement Transformations in African Political 
Landscapes.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 5, no. 2: 233–55. 
Zompetti, Joseph P. 1997. “Toward a Gramscian Critical Rhetoric.” Western Journal of 
Communication 61, no. 1: 66–86. 
 
Global Africana Review 
Vol. 3, Spring 2019 
 32 
 







This article explores solidarity as an important political praxis with diverse ways of participation 
through a case study of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s student anti-apartheid 
movement. Research heavily draws upon primary resources from the Southern Historical 
Collection at the Wilson Library. Secondary resources are utilized to contextualize the history of 
apartheid, internal resistance, and anti-apartheid solidarity within the global community. The 
focus is placed primarily on the Anti-Apartheid Support Group (AASG) due to limited archival 
materials. This article explores the AASG’s organizational structure, influences, collaborating 
organizations, strategies and tactics employed, challenges, and gains to argue that student 
solidarity efforts made an impact on the national anti-apartheid movement by influencing public 
awareness and policies that eventually aided the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
While the AASG was a prominent student organization, it does not represent the entire UNC-
Chapel Hill student movement nor paint a picture of the exact way the movement occurred, as 
there were various students who participated outside of university-recognized organizational 
bodies. Additionally, there were other student organizations such as the Black Student 
Movement and Action Against Apartheid, the participation of which is not fully accounted for 
due to the lack of an archival collection. 





The acts of coalition building and solidarity can amplify the concerns of multiple groups working 
toward a similar goal. The modern system of apartheid began when the Afrikaner National Party 
came into power in the Republic of South Africa in 1948. Their campaign promises capitalized 
on the white population’s interest in their own preservation by legally codifying and 
exacerbating already existing segregationist practices. Apartheid, referring to the systematic 
separation of races, developed as a method of racial control to ensure that the minority white 
population continued its legal and social dominance over the majority non-white population. 
Global opposition against the apartheid regime’s reign of terror, both within the South African 
state and in the greater southern African region, led to the formation of various international 
coalitions and solidarity movements, including student-led efforts on college campuses across 
the United States. This article analyzes the impact of solidarity efforts from US colleges, based 
on their influence on policy and public awareness, through a case study of a student-led anti-
apartheid organization at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-Chapel Hill). 
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Organized anti-apartheid solidarity in the US began in the early twentieth century with black 
activist organizations like the Council on African Affairs (CAA) and the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The CAA and NAACP promoted pan-
African philosophies and saw apartheid as an injustice to all black people. These two 
organizations helped launch the first international campaign for sanctions against South Africa at 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 (Nesbitt 2004, 7). The CAA had a strong 
relationship with the African National Congress (ANC), an organization of South Africans 
committed to multiracial rule and most commonly associated with Nelson Mandela. The CAA 
engaged in mass educational efforts to connect the plight of South Africans to black Americans 
in the Jim Crow era (Ransby 2013, 152). Early gains in this period included the nonbinding UN 
Resolution 1761 of 1962, calling on all members to end economic and military ties with South 
Africa. Despite this, US leaders were reluctant to strongly condemn or embargo South Africa. 
US militarism was fueled by natural resources produced in South Africa, and both nations had an 
interest in quelling the perceived threat of communism (Nesbitt 2004, 5–7). Thus, direct 
American corporate investment in South Africa continued to rise, from $50 million in 1943 to 
$490 million by 1966 (Jackson 1989, 27–29), and South Africa’s defense and military budget 
more than quadrupled in the 1960s alone (Jackson 1989, 23–24). With the lack of formal 
pressure from the US government, small local radical organizations and civil rights organizations 
were the engines that sustained American efforts against South Africa’s regional imperialism and 
its effects on bordering states, as well as internal anti-black terrorism. Eventually, college 
students joined the anti-apartheid movement as a way to directly influence the contributions their 
institutions made to the South African economy. The student divestment movement occurred in 
three waves, each categorized by its organizational structure, major influencing organizations, 
types of resources, and tactics employed. The case study undertaken in this research is the 
movement at UNC-Chapel Hill during the third wave; however, the argument that student 
solidarity efforts had an impact on the anti-apartheid movement through influence on public 
awareness and policy is a culmination of all three waves. 
 
The First Wave: 1965–1970 
The first wave began on March 19, 1965 with a demonstration of five hundred students at Chase 
Manhattan Bank in New York City, opposing the renewal of bank loans to South Africa’s 
government (Jackson 1989, 21–22). The demonstration was followed by a sit-in where forty-nine 
people were arrested. Organizations involved in the demonstration included Students for a 
Democratic Society, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE). These organizations, particularly the black civil rights organizations, 
increasingly began linking the destinies of black people in the United States to that of those on 
the African continent. They recognized that America’s exploitative economic and racial system 
was deeply married to the continued existence of imperialism and colonialism abroad. 
The SNCC and CORE, alongside religious organizations and churches, were the main 
organizers of demonstrations. The anti-apartheid movement at this stage had no single 
centralized national leadership. The American Committee on Africa (ACOA), founded in 1953, 
was a major organization within the anti-apartheid movement that played a consulting role for 
student activists who were developing demands and divestment petitions for their respective 
universities. Other tactics utilized by students were marches, sit-ins/building occupations, and 
rallies (Jackson 1989, 23). Several universities such as Cornell and Princeton sold their stocks 
from companies with ties to South Africa due to student pressure, but most institutions refused to 
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capitulate to student demands (Jackson 1989, 25). The first wave of the student divestment 
movement was able to wield influence that led to the termination of over $40 million dollars in 
bank loans (Jackson 1989, 26). As the immediate goals to shut down such bank loans and 
institutional investments in South Africa were partially met, perceived success led to a decline in 
movement participation (Jackson 1989, 28–39). Other factors that led to the decline of the first 
wave were the instability of college students’ four-year academic schedules and the urgency of 
domestic issues like the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement (Jackson 1989, 30–33). 
The first wave succeeded in drawing awareness to the power that college institutions had due to 
their investments in the form of bonds, shares, and loans, and also created a blueprint that would 
be revived and reconstructed during the second wave. 
 
The Second Wave: 1977–1980 
The second wave of the student-led anti-apartheid movement in the US was triggered by internal 
resistance in South Africa and was characterized by more developed organizations focusing on 
apartheid. The Soweto uprising of 1976 and the killing of South African activist Steve Biko 
while in police custody sparked international outrage. During the Soweto massacre, over five 
hundred peaceful youth demonstrators were killed (Jackson 1989, 40). Images from the massacre 
and the resulting uprisings in over one hundred cities inspired a new wave of solidarity 
movements that spread internationally. Representatives from six national organizations including 
the Washington Office on Africa and ACOA mobilized to form the National Coalition for the 
Liberation of South Africa (NCLSA) (Chapman Papers, Folder 69). The NCLSA planned 
national conferences beginning in 1978, and student participants from over forty-eight colleges 
helped to organize national days of protest and the distribution of educational newsletters. Other 
regional conferences were held for the midwest at Northwestern University and the southeast at 
Duke University in 1978. Regional student coalitions within the NCLSA worked closely with 
ACOA’s National Student Coordinator to manage student divestment efforts within national 
divestment campaigns and to advocate for tactics such as student referendums and proposals for 
investment advisory committees (Jackson 1989, 38). 
The second wave was mostly characterized by institutionalization and selective or partial 
divestment gains (Jackson 1989, 40–50). Universities, aiming to quell student activists, 
established investment advisory committees tasked with reviewing investment policies, taking 
into account shareholder resolutions and grievances regarding the companies they held shares in. 
As the student anti-apartheid movement became more institutionalized, universities were able to 
control the demands of the movement through negotiation and minimal reform. One reform 
method of note was the Sullivan Principles, created in 1977 by respected black activist Reverend 
Leon Sullivan as a guide to achieving better corporate ethics practices in South Africa. Among 
other objectives, the principles called for the equal treatment of employees regardless of race as a 
condition for doing business (“Anti-Apartheid Support Group Report to Board of Trustees” n.d.). 
Most student activists in the US only achieved partial or selective divestment; however, by 1978, 
about forty colleges had adopted the Sullivan principles and/or established investment advisory 
committees to make ethical recommendations. Although mainly minimal reform was achieved, 
more institutionalized methods of activism allowed awareness initiatives to reach vast audiences. 
Through student polls, lectures by exiled South African activists, referendums, film screenings, 
fundraisers, and newsletters on and from South Africa, popular support against apartheid 
increased and made way for the third wave of student activism. 
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The Third Wave: 1984–1987 
During the third wave of student activism, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
developed a sustained anti-apartheid movement as a result of characteristics distinct to the new 
national campaign. After student pressure and like many other institutions, the university adopted 
the Sullivan principles in 1982 (“Report to the Trustees of the Endowment Board” n.d.). The 
third wave was triggered in 1983 by the creation of a tri-cameral South African Parliament that 
still excluded black South Africans from participation. On November 21, 1984, a pan-Africanist 
organization named TransAfrica launched a sit-in at the South Africa Embassy to protest US 
complacency toward the South African government (Nesbitt 1989, 51). TransAfrica leader 
Randall Robinson was arrested alongside Congressional Black Caucus member Walter E. 
Fauntroy and Congresswoman Mary Frances Berry. This sit-in launched a series of 
demonstrations at embassies across the nation that resulted in the arrests of several hundred 
people, including Yolanda King, daughter of Martin Luther King Jr., and Jesse Jackson, 
effectively creating the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) and the third wave of student 
activism. 
Spearheaded by national anti-apartheid organizations, the FSAM catalyzed the third wave of 
student activism by creating accessible points of entry to mass protest. TransAfrica coordinated 
the naming of March 21 to April 6 of 1985 as the “Week of National Anti-Apartheid Action” and 
April 4 as the “National Protest Day for South African Divestment” (Nesbitt 1989, 60–77). 
Hundreds of colleges across the nation reintroduced disruptive tactics by holding demonstrations 
during the week of action. The third wave of activism was aimed at employing diverse tactics in 
an effort to avoid the minimal or “progressive” reform seen in the second wave. 
At UNC-Chapel Hill, the Anti-Apartheid Support Group (AASG) emerged as a leading front 
for student activism. The AASG was officially recognized as a student organization on October 
16, 1985 (“Office of Vice Chancellor and Provost” 1985). The group’s constitution proclaimed 
racism to be “the heaviest burden carried on the shoulders of humankind” and South African 
apartheid to be a curse (“UNC Anti-Apartheid Support Group Constitution” n.d.). Despite the 
adoption of “ethical business” policies through the Sullivan Principles, UNC investments in 
companies operating in South Africa increased (“Report to the Trustees of the Endowment 
Board” n.d.), convincing the AASG that a movement for full divestiture was the only way 
forward. Its stated goal was to achieve the “abolition of racism, particularly South African 
apartheid, and the establishment of majority non-racist rule in South Africa” (“UNC Anti-
Apartheid Support Group Constitution” n.d.). The organization’s membership was open to all so 
long as there was a desire to fight apartheid. Although the acting president of the AASG was 
Herman Bennett, the organization aimed to have a non-hierarchical leadership model by rotating 
the position of chairperson for the committee as a whole between members, based on majority 
vote, at each meeting. The AASG forged three committees to accomplish its missions: 
Education, Coordinating, and Program. Its membership base grew from thirty to over one 
hundred members within the first few months, and the organization thrived in its mission by 
constantly appealing to mass members of the campus and the local community. 
 
Coalitions – Students and National Organizations 
As exhibited in the case of UNC-Chapel Hill, the third wave of student activism greatly utilized 
diverse coalitions comprised of local and national organizations, students, public representatives, 
religious institutions, and the faculty and staff of universities. The student anti-apartheid 
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movement and the AASG heavily relied on the support provided by national organizations for 
resources including propaganda, contacts, action items, and guidelines. The Africa Fund, a non-
profit organization founded in 1966 in association with the American Committee on Africa, was 
a pivotal directory for consistent and reliable updates. The Africa Fund published scholarly 
articles in the Literature List that acted as directories of information related to the anti-apartheid 
movement for easy access and redistribution (“Literature List” n.d.). The Africa Fund also 
produced a magazine called Southern Africa Perspectives that featured direct eyewitness reports 
from South Africans describing the grave living conditions, displacement, and other injustices 
(“Southern Africa Perspectives” n.d.). The magazine included columns that debunked objections 
to divestment and gave other movement-related updates. Another magazine that aided students 
was the United States Anti-Apartheid Newsletter, published by the American Friends Service 
Committee. The Washington Office on Africa produced single pieces of literature as needed 
called “Action Alerts” (“Washington Office on Africa Action Alerts” n.d.). These alerts 
contained information on legislation related to southern Africa and on immediate steps for 
individuals to take by referencing which congressional representatives to target. National 
organizations also communicated to student activists directly through national calls and emails. 
The “Call to Conscience” emergency response network was another system for rapid 
dissemination of information and action items within the movement. In August 1986, the Anti-
Apartheid Support Group published the first issue of its own newsletter titled UNC/Soweto 
(AASG collection), which largely mirrored and referenced the magazines produced by national 
anti-apartheid organizations. 
 
Coalitions – Students and Local Entities 
Almost immediately after its inception, the Anti-Apartheid Support Group began building 
coalitions with groups in the UNC-Chapel Hill area. Most of these partnerships, based on the 
records collected, were tied to the university institution. The faculty council chaired by George 
A. Kennedy created the “Faculty Resolution of 1985” on November 15 to reflect their official 
position on apartheid. The resolution proclaimed the moral problems within the system of 
apartheid to be incompatible with “principles of intellectual freedom and human dignity” 
(“Faculty Resolution of 1985”), and proposed that all funds associated with companies operating 
in or with South Africa’s government be eliminated from the university’s portfolio and the State 
Retirement Fund portfolio. The faculty council understood the importance of solidarity with 
students’ efforts. In their November 15 meeting, they discussed student activists’ actions on 
November 14, stating that the “student body presented a similar resolution to the Investment 
Committee of the Board of Trustees (BOT),” which was turned down (“Faculty Meeting Notes, 
Section V” 1985). The council hoped that by adopting the resolution, “[students and faculty] can 
do together what could not be done alone” (“Faculty Meeting Notes, Section V” 1985). 
Chancellor Christopher Fordham expressed his support of the students and faculty resolutions, 
but had little power to take any action without support from the BOT. Students, however, 
capitalized on the presence of progressive faculty and made attempts to network. In the spring of 
1986, the AASG sent a mailout to professors, admitting, “Students alone cannot affect the 
desired policy changes” (“UNC Anti-Apartheid Support Group Letter to Professors” n.d.). 
Professors and departments responded by supporting the AASG through educational events, 
posting flyers created by the group, and donating to and/or dispersing information on the group’s 
fundraising efforts for UNC/Soweto and other campaigns (AASG Collection). The AASG 
partnered with the African and Afro-American Studies department to co-host a talk with exiled 
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South African Don Ngeubeni, called Living Under Apartheid, on March 19, 1986 (“Living 
Under Apartheid Flyer” n.d.). Later that year, on December 12, the faculty council adopted 
another resolution calling for the establishment of an investment review board comprised of 
faculty and students. The Board of Trustees voted six to five against a divestment resolution that 
same day; however, it was the “closest the university [had] ever come to full divestment” (“Jerry 
Jones” n.d.). Although the AASG had previously made the same request for a review board, 
faculty cooperation helped amplify the AASG’s efforts to move closer to divestment. 
The AASG collaborated with student organizations to address the issues of sustaining visible 
support and building on-campus involvement. As advertised in an issue of UNC/Soweto 
published on October 29, 1986, the AASG and the Carolina Committee on Central America 
hosted a three-day conference called “Students Organizing Students (SOS)” from October 3 to 6 
that was based on skill sharing and building progressive consciousness. The schedule included 
educational programs on South Africa, group strategy sessions, and workshops on civil 
disobedience, recruitment, lobbying, and organizing (“Students Organizing Students Agenda, 
UNC/Soweto” 1986). Over one hundred people attended the conference keynote given by chief 
US representative of the ANC Neo Mnumzana (The News and Observer, October 4, 1986). The 
AASG also had a positive relationship with the Black Student Movement (BSM) and used their 
mailing list for contacts (“BSM Mailing List” n.d.). Beyond the BSM and the Carolina 
Committee on Central America, the extent of collaboration with other campus organizations is 
unclear through the available archived documents. However, the AASG also joined a Triangle 
Area1 coalition made up of the Committee for Peace with Justice in South Africa (Durham), the 
North Carolinians Against Apartheid (Raleigh) group, and other concerned individuals and 
medical personnel, to launch the Southern Africa Medical Aid project in the fall of 1986. They 
were able to raise over $16,000 for the project by April 1987 (“Students Organizing Students 
Agenda, UNC/Soweto” 1986). The AASG’s ability to build support networks of community 
members, faculty, and staff greatly contributed to their success.2 
 
The New Divestment Campaign 
New divestment campaigns focused on total, rather than partial, divestment as the primary goal 
that would bring about disinvestment – the process of eliminating private corporations’ 
ownership of physical assets (Lowenberg et al. 1987, 459). In 1985, at least one hundred 
organizations focused on divestment and/or disinvestment were created on college campuses 
across the nation. New and existing organizations conducted reviews of their own university’s 
investment policies and demanded that endowment boards abandon the Sullivan Principles for 
being ineffective. In a letter to the UNC-Chapel Hill Board of Trustees on November 14, 1985, 
the AASG wrote: “The codes cannot and do not attempt to address themselves to the basic 
structures of apartheid such as the homelands, migratory labor, cheap labor, pass laws and the 
                                                             
1 The Research Triangle of North Carolina is comprised of Raleigh, Durham and Chapel Hill. 
See https://www.researchtriangle.org/. 
2 The extent to which the AASG collaborated or was influenced by local entities is not 
represented in this article due to limited archival materials. Much of the AASG collection 
focuses on the group’s interactions with national organizations, and mostly leaves out the pivotal 
role of local entities and more radical organizations in sustaining the anti-apartheid movement. 
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complex legal restrictions on regime opponents…the University should abandon its support for 
the Sullivan Principles and adopt a total divestment strategy” (“Letter to the UNC-Chapel Hill 
Board of Trustees” 1985). AASG demands included a timeline for when the university system 
should sell all assets connected to South Africa, an immediate end to any purchases with 
corporations doing business in South Africa, and the establishment of a committee comprised of 
representatives from the AASG, Faculty Council, Black Faculty Caucus, Graduate and 
Professional Students Organization, Student Government, and the Board of Trustees to re-
evaluate the university’s investment policies. 
The AASG’s demands were ignored, and five months later it released the Report to the 
Trustees of the Endowment Board on April 4, 1986. This report showed that under the 
university’s current policy, which made use of the Sullivan Principles, stock holdings had grown 
from $5.7 million to $8.8 million between November 1985 and March 1986. The detailed report 
provided a list of all the companies the university was engaged in with ties to South Africa and 
argued for the importance of divestment before restating the policy demands the AASG had 
previously introduced. 
Simultaneous efforts to pass divestment legislation were both fueled by and benefited student 
divestment movements. The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), an organization of black 
congressional members founded in 1971, was a pivotal vehicle for legislative sanctions against 
South Africa (Nesbitt 2004, 130). The CBC fiercely opposed President Reagan’s complacency 
around South African apartheid, called “constructive engagement,” and drew on connections 
between apartheid and America’s own system of racial hierarchy (Nesbitt 2004, 130). The CBC 
made passing a sanction bill a chief priority and mobilized to gain the support of both Democrats 
and Republicans, who increasingly wanted to dissociate from apartheid. On October 2, their 
efforts came to fruition and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was passed, 
overriding Reagan’s veto (Nesbitt 2004, 130–40). This moderate version of the act, which was 
first proposed in 1972, prohibited new investments in South Africa, made restrictions on 
government and commercial ties, and prohibited the importation of some products (Nesbitt 2004, 
143–44). The News and Observer reported that, in his keynote at the SOS conference at UNC-
Chapel Hill, ANC member Neo Mnumzana praised the sanction bill as a step in the right 
direction that “may encourage other countries…to oppose apartheid more actively” (October 4, 
1986). Students played a role by writing letters, calling, and lobbying to congressional 
representatives. Mass demonstrations that attracted negative international attention to the US also 
considerably influenced the increase in public and congressional support for economic 
consequences for South Africa in light of its apartheid system. 
In January 1987, new guidelines for divestment were issued by five national organizations 
involved in the Free South Africa Movement. The Africa Fund produced a “Unified List of 
United States Companies with Investments or Loans in South Africa and Namibia” from June 
1985 to March 1987, to be used as a resource for students to create investment reports and 
divestment proposals based on the new guidelines issued by the five prominent organizations. 
 
Tactics 
The third wave of student activism saw the employment of diverse tactics with educational, 
direct action, and artistic components. These tactics, some already discussed above, included lists 
of demands, referendums, investment reviews and policy recommendations, newsletters, lecture 
series, film screenings, sit-ins, and marches. Upon its inception, the first event the AASG held 
was a rally on October 1, 1985 (“Educate Yourself! AASG Rally Flyers” n.d.). In February of 
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1986, the UNC-Chapel Hill Endowment Board refused to abide by the wishes of seventy percent 
of students, who had voted in campus elections for divestment. As a result, the AASG erected 
shanty towns on the Quad (“UNC Divestment History” n.d.). The shanty homes were built with 
metal scraps and other makeshift materials to represent the deprived conditions that black South 
Africans lived in. AASG members aimed to amplify awareness and draw attention to the 
divestment solutions proposed to the BOT. The erection of shanty towns on campuses as a means 
of peaceful protest first occurred at Cornell University in 1985, but this tactic soon spread to a 
number of other universities, including Johns Hopkin, Georgetown, and George Mason. The 
AASG utilized quantitative research and referendum results in their November 1985 Report to 
the Trustees of the Endowment Board to illustrate a convincing argument to the BOT before 
escalating to build shanty towns in March 1986. The AASG’s policy advocacy, as well as direct-
action demonstrations, sustained a diversity of tactics meant to pressure the Board of Endowment 
to approve a full divestment. 
 
Challenges 
Like other student organizations within the movement, the AASG experienced both in-group and 
outside challenges around tactics and ideologies. For instance, College Republicans (CR) and 
Students for America (SA) came out in opposition to the shanty towns one month after the 
demonstrations began. In a letter sent to Chancellor Fordham on March 27, 1986, the CR and SA 
claimed that the shanties were defacing the university and demanded that they be removed by 
noon on April 1 (“Letter to Chancellor Fordham” 1986). The CR and SA threatened to erect a 
Berlin-type wall to “protest the oppression by the Soviet Union…and the left’s hypocrisy for 
addressing only one case of human rights violations,” if the shanties were not removed (“Letter 
to Chancellor Fordham” 1986). The April 1 deadline was not met, and the CR attempted to erect 
a wall made of wood, chicken wire, and sheets, but it was quickly vandalized and abandoned 
(“Students Demand that Hypocrisy End” n.d.). Chancellor Fordham set an April 7 deadline for 
students in the shanties to disperse. Five students were arrested for trespassing after refusing to 
leave their shanties when crews came to tear them down. All charges against demonstrators were 
later dropped, and no serious violent acts occurred on the UNC-Chapel Hill campus. 
AASG members frequently engaged in heated exchanges with individuals who did not 
believe that divestment was the right strategy to help advance the anti-apartheid struggle. Despite 
support from Chancellor Fordham and the newly-elected student body president Bryan Hassel, 
the Endowment Board of the Board of Trustees was the primary obstacle. The board objected to 
divestment on the grounds that it went against their responsibility to uphold the financial interest 
of the university. The board estimated that they would lose “approximately one million dollars a 
year” with divestment, with some members promoting the congressional Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act as the best course of action (“UNC Divestment History” n.d.). 
Student organizers also understood the difficulty of sustaining a student movement to 
influence the BOT: “students come and go but Trustees have all the time they want” (“Donnie 
Trevathan” n.d.). The creation of a new organization called the South Africa Scholarship Fund 
(SASF) by Richard Hoile and Francesca Varcoe became a point of contestation about different 
strategies. The SASF was established to sponsor the education of a black South African at a 
predominantly white, higher education institution in South Africa. The group then formed an 
agreement with the Endowment Board, which pledged to match each dollar raised. AASG 
member Donnie Trevathan noted in an open letter that divestment was never introduced as the 
“be all end all” solution or as the only way to perform solidarity (“Cindy Hahamovitch: 
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Counterpoint” n.d.). The AASG emphasized that it endorsed a diversity of tactics to amplify the 
anti-apartheid struggle; so, while the efforts of the BOT in supporting the SASF were good, it did 
not mean that full divestment should not continue to be pursued. 
Furthermore, the AASG faced criticism from individuals who felt that while divestment was 
the right path, the AASG was not radical enough in its direct-action tactics. In an op-ed to the 
March 20, 1986 edition of The Daily Tar Heel, one student criticized the shanty towns erected on 
the UNC-Chapel Hill campus for not “replicating in great detail” the degree of gruesomeness in 
South Africa, writing that “the three shanties…project an image not of oppression and 
institutionalized racism, but of poverty” (The Daily Tar Heel 1986). The author also critiqued the 
AASG for negotiating with Chancellor Fordham about when to remove the shanties, arguing that 
it was a form of “constructive engagement.” Disagreement within the AASG membership 
resulted in the formation of a new group called Action Against Apartheid. In “An Open Letter to 
UNC Anti-Apartheid Support Group,” this new faction cited ideology and tactics as the reason 
for separation, stating that “Action Against Apartheid will be built around the philosophy of 
action through education and education through direct action” (AASG collection). No further 
archival documents were located indicating the group’s presence on campus beyond this 
introductory letter. 
 
Small Gains to Large Triumphs 
Despite the challenges of student organizing in general, the third wave of the student anti-
apartheid movement in US colleges accomplished significant gains. On October 1, 1987, 
organizers declared a win when the UNC-Chapel Hill Endowment Board agreed to divest all 
funds from South African companies (The Daily Tar Heel n.d.). On a national scale, between 
1985 and 1987, seventy-five universities committed to either full or partial divestment of their 
South African stock; by 1988, a total of 155 colleges had divested their portfolio, with more 
institutions committing to full divestment than in any other wave (Jackson 1989, 64–67). 
Between 1986 and 1987 alone, ninety-six US firms withdrew from South Africa and the total 
amount from state and local actions surpassed $18 billion dollars. Duke University was the first 
to adopt a full divestment timetable in 1986 in the Raleigh–Durham Triangle area, serving as 
local inspiration for the AASG’s own persistence (The News and Observer, October 4, 1986). By 
1989, the US was among twenty-two countries around the world with economic penalties against 
South Africa's apartheid regime. South Africa experienced massive capital flight as businesses 
and investors left, causing its national currency to become devalued and inflated (Gethard 2008). 
As a result, Prime Minister Frederik W de Klerk began to undo components of apartheid 
beginning in 1990, until its eventual demise in 1992 with the Apartheid Referendum. 
 
Conclusion 
Along with influencing investment policies, student activists were able to raise and sustain public 
awareness on the conditions of apartheid through literature, lectures, rallies, and other direct-
action tactics. The gains made by student activists were actualized through crucial partnerships 
with other students, community members, local and national organizations, South Africans, and 
the faculty and staff of their institutions. The momentum of the divestment movement at both 
local and national levels gained international attention, amplifying the moral and political threat 
of South Africa. After its win for full divestment, the AASG dwindled both in purpose and 
presence on campus, and there are few archival sources to help formulate an explanation of their 
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whereabouts post 1987. Nevertheless, the Anti-Apartheid Support Group at UNC-Chapel Hill 
provides a valuable case study of the methods, challenges, and accomplishments of the student 
anti-apartheid movement in the United States, and what it was able to achieve through acts of 
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Disparaging portrayals of African Americans in American media outlets have long been a site of 
much critique and protest. In Double Negative: The Black Image and Popular Culture (2018), 
Racquel Gates critically analyzes the ways in which African Americans potentially benefit in 
terms of economic, political, and social gains as a result of these negative images. In exploring 
the negative African-American images that proliferate contemporary media representations, 
Gates establishes a theoretical framework to approach and study such images, and calls for a 
critical analysis of their use. She references films like Boyz n the Hood (1991), Coming to 
America (1988), and New Jack City (1991); stars like Flavor Flav, Halle Berry, and Katt 
Williams; and, current reality television shows like Real Housewives of Atlanta (2012–present), 
Basketball Wives (2010–present), and Love & Hip Hop Atlanta (2012–present). Gates proposes 
that negative images are able to be used to confront issues that impact the black community and 
American society in ways that more positive images cannot. 
Gates insists that shows like Real Housewives of Atlanta – though considered by many as 
problematic for their depiction of black women – utilize negative images to challenge the limits 
of black respectability politics. These black respectability politics encompass what we typically 
deem as acceptable representations, especially in the context of uplifting African Americans 
within the larger society of the United States. This reviewer found Gates’ Double Negative to be 
a useful intervention that successfully explores the positive impacts of negative images, 
particularly those used in reality television. 
In establishing her theoretical framework, Gates categorizes negativity into five distinct 
types: formal, relational or comparative, circumstantial, strategic, and false. By grouping 
negative images this way, Gates can explore each in great detail. Subsequently, she offers 
suggestions regarding how such negatively perceived images may, unexpectedly, result in 
positive outcomes. For example, in her work on strategic negativity, Gates theorizes that the 
black women on the reality television show Real Housewives of Atlanta embrace the negativity 
associated with “ghetto” or “ratchet” characteristics to achieve personal and professional agency. 
Gates highlights how these women often use negative behaviors to brand themselves and even 
market products, in order to further their own career and personal objectives. In fact, Gates 
asserts, “Beyond the coded forms of labor that occur on the show, reality television also offers an 
excellent platform for cast members to launch and promote their own products and business 
ventures” (156). She reports that the women on The Real Housewives, Basketball Wives, Love & 
Hip Hop Atlanta, and many other reality television shows, “pitch a wide variety of merchandise 
including T-shirts, lingerie, lip gloss, hair extensions, and even specialty cognac” (156). She goes 
on to highlight how stars without products instead brand themselves for financial and 
employment gain: 
Leakes has managed to translate her larger-than-life persona and penchant for coming up 
with memorable catchphrases into a legitimate career beyond Housewives….Beyond the 
Tyson Review of Double Negative 
 
 45 
world of reality television, Leakes caught the attention of the television producer Ryan 
Murphy, who first cast her as the recurring character Roz Washington on his popular musical 
dramedy Glee (FOX), and then later as Rocky Rhoades on his sitcom The New Normal 
(NBC). When Normal was canceled after only a season, Leakes appeared on Broadway as 
the wicked stepmother in a production of Cinderella and then as Mama Morton in Chicago. 
In addition, Leakes has cohosted entertainment programs like The View, Live with Kelly and 
Michael, and Fashion Police, has made guest appearances on a variety of sitcoms, talk shows, 
and other TV programs, including The Real Husbands of Hollywood, Jimmy Kimmel Live!, 
and the Ellen DeGeneres Show; and toured the country in a one-woman standup show (157–
58). 
Accordingly, Gates proposes, the women deliberately perpetuate attitudes, behaviors, and 
expressions that many consider to be negative, in order to negotiate economic and political 
advancement within the constrained system of reality television. For example, while many 
criticized women like Nene Leakes for the considerable degree to which she perpetuated these 
types of negative images, by neck-rolling and speaking African-American Vernacular English, 
among other behaviors, she was able to successfully set herself apart from other cast members, 
thereby positioning herself for a greater degree of financial success. 
As Gates emphasizes, reality television has largely been excluded from academic journals, 
which limits critical scholarship on the genre and its potential benefits. When important 
discussions do arise in the public sphere, scholarly critiques often focus on deconstructing the 
negative imagery that reality television promotes. This rhetoric encompasses sexism, 
homophobia, and racism. Such rhetoric also dismisses the fact that this genre is capable of 
tackling germane social issues. She goes on to argue that such dismissals are, in part, what fuels 
the women’s ability to strategically highlight topics that those deemed as decorous individuals 
fail to address, because reality television is “a genre that truly occupies the ‘gutter’ within 
qualitative assessments of the media landscape” (145). She points out that, “Beginning in 
roughly 2004, Bravo and VH1, in particular, have enjoyed a ratings bonanza when they began 
producing content aimed at African American women audiences” (147). An additional positive 
outcome is that this content reaches certain demographics, and allows those who otherwise may 
not have a voice to engage in social discussions that are articulated in a familiar vernacular. 
Double Negative skillfully investigates these and many other negative images portrayed in 
the modern context, making it a significant critique on contemporary black representation. This 
book challenges pre-existing views that consume the public discourse regarding the magnitude of 
negative images, and provides an alternative perspective. Gates’ book is therefore a critical 
intervention on the proliferation of negative images, and the ways that such images can be used 
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Adam Ewing’s book, The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement 
and Changed Global Black Politics (2016), illustrates the climate that gave rise to twentieth-
century Pan-Africanism, and specifically, Garveyism. Notably, Ewing does not delve into either 
the life of Marcus Garvey or his philosophy at the onset of his book. This is intentional so that he 
can contextualize the core themes of the book and introduce twentieth-century questions of race. 
His core themes include Pan-Africanism, black self-determination, and discourse around black 
leadership, and Garvey’s efforts are examples of these themes as much as they are results of 
them. It is important to explore the impact of these themes both globally and within the United 
States, as well as how they may have changed the way blacks assert their understanding of race. 
The Age of Garvey (2016) provides valuable insight into the birth and spread of the Pan-
Africanist movement, as well as grapples with problems faced within the movement, such as 
leadership, strategy, and how to unite blacks. 
Pan-Africanism, or the idea that everyone of African descent should unite to uplift the black 
race, is one of the most prominent themes Ewing covers in the book. It is the foundation on 
which most of Garvey’s rhetoric lies. Marcus Mosiah Garvey, born in 1887 in Jamaica, was a 
twentieth-century civil rights leader most known for his tailored vision of Pan-Africanism, which 
was an amalgamation of global ideas of race. Though he was born in Jamaica, Garvey was 
educated in London and carried out most of his work in the United States, specifically in Harlem 
(Ewing 2016, 14). Notably, Garvey’s Pan-Africanism included the eventual return to a politically 
and economically separatist Liberian colony, of which he would be named the leader (Ewing 
2016, 137). 
The majority of the first half of this book is not about Garvey. Instead, Ewing uses this part 
of his study to contextualize Garvey’s life and ascent to civil rights leader. He begins with the 
political and racial climate of Garvey’s home country of Jamaica, focusing initially on the 
Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865. Despite slavery having been abolished on the island decades 
earlier, there were colonialists who refused to enfranchise blacks. The rebellion is Ewing’s first 
introduction of blacks’ attempts at nation-making and attempting to seize their rights (Ewing, 
2016, 29). Garveyism is initially introduced here, and Ewing helpfully situates it as neither 
radical nor conservative, but as an amalgamation of ideas, discourse, and events happening to 
Africans and African descendants (31). 
Ewing also uses European countries’ racially-based perceptions of their colonial subjects to 
contextualize Pan-Africanism. For example, England envisioned a plan for citizenship and 
independence for colonies such as Australia and Canada, yet saw their African and Caribbean 
subjects as perpetual children who could never be independent. This racist paternalism 
compelled blacks in colonies and newly-liberated countries to seek institutions to remedy the 
oppression they faced. The resulting conflict manifested in rebellion across African colonies and 
the Caribbean, inspiring the rallying cry of “Africa for Africans!” (Ewing 2016, 89). Discourse 
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varied on who should lead these movements – from Garvey in Jamaica, Washington or DuBois 
in the United States, or Harry Thuku in Kenya (Ewing 2016, 119). 
The latter half of the book focuses more on Garvey and what Garveyism looked like in 
action. Garveyism’s central focus was to uplift the black race through means such as education 
and economic empowerment. One such method included bringing blacks across the colonized 
world and closer to what Garvey viewed as modernity – minus the air of paternalism that 
accompanied white imperialism. These desires prompted Garvey’s ambitious efforts, such as 
establishing the “Back to Africa” Movement in the 1920s, creating the Universal Negro 
Improvement Association (UNIA), and opening of his own shipping line, the Black Star Line. 
His movement gained global political and financial support from blacks in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, with many believing that he might hold the key to the post-emancipation 
future of the black race (Ewing 2016, 151). The UNIA, founded on the principles of Garveyism, 
advocated territorial separatism as the solution to black subjugation, and counseled its followers 
to work and suffer as a collective to achieve liberation as an entire race (Ewing 2016, 151). 
It is impossible to analyze Garvey and his efforts outside of the context of Pan-Africanism. 
Though Garvey did not invent Pan-Africanism, he subscribed heavily to it, putting the needs of 
the black race before all others (Ewing 2016, 29). Pan-Africanism, however, in and of itself is 
not a solution to racism nor a way to escape it. On this front, Garvey was tasked with 
determining how he wanted his vision of Pan-Africanism to materialize and what exactly he 
expected to achieve. Garvey’s ideal version of Pan-Africanism included creating institutions for 
blacks, encouraging brotherhood, and instructing his followers to not let fear deter them from 
uplifting the black race (Ewing 2016, 157). His principles rested largely on a foundation of self-
determination. Because of this, Garvey appealed not only to African Americans, but also to those 
Africans living in colonies, who were considered second-class citizens in their homeland. His 
work inspired extra-governmental welfare programs and self-help economic practices from the 
United States to the African continent, especially in places such as Nyasaland (part of present-
day Malawi) (Ewing 2016, 216). Uniting was a way to solidify and draw upon the strengths of 
black cultures to dismantle white supremacy, rather than beg for acceptance in a Westernized 
world. 
Within black communities, there oftentimes existed the idea that there had to be one leader to 
advance the race. Garvey’s time was no different, and Ewing references this throughout his 
book. He especially does so through his mention of Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois, 
black American leaders who also had the goal of racial uplift, but who had contrasting ideas on 
how to achieve such a feat. Ewing creates a stark contrast between Garvey and DuBois by 
pointing out similarities between Washington and Garvey, such as their beliefs in vocational 
competency and desire for separatism (Ewing 2016, 47). DuBois, adamant about being accepted 
into white society, opposed these sentiments, asserting that select groups of blacks should seek 
respect through academic betterment. DuBois also suggested that blacks fight for their countries 
in World War I (including colonized Africans), and then use their loyalty as grounds to request 
better treatment after the war was won (Ewing 2016, 71). This approach, of course, differed 
greatly from Washington and Garvey’s beliefs on the war. Garvey and Washington believed 
blacks had no place in the war and should not risk their lives to defend countries that did not treat 
them as citizens. 
Ewing also relates how the desire to unify the black race combined with wartime nationalism 
inspired a Moses complex among some black leaders. This sentiment was evident once Garvey 
was arrested in the United States, and after his Black Star Line and the UNIA failed. It was at 
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this point that DuBois proudly stated that blacks had not fallen prey to Garveyism or 
Washingtonianism (Ewing 2016, 121). Despite his efforts and intentions, Garvey could never 
achieve his goal of uniting the black community, simply because of the diversity of opinions 
regarding how best to do this. This begs the question of what is more important: is it who is 
credited with leading a movement, or what goals are actually achieved? Such a question extends 
to Garvey, whom Ewing characterizes as more interested in being the authoritarian face of his 
movement than letting what he intended to achieve take precedence over his leadership (Ewing 
2016, 121). 
In terms of content, Ewing made a smart choice in not telling the story solely from Garvey’s 
point of view or making the book strictly a biography. Such an approach would have failed to 
serve his purpose of both analyzing Garvey as the individual, and the climate that shaped his 
ideas. This also fits the theme of Pan-Africanism, as Garvey’s ideas did not come from one 
country or school of thought, but from a combination of racial discourses throughout the 
diaspora. Ewing expounds heavily on global resistance, such as in Kenya, Zambia, Jamaica, and 
the United States. In addition, he introduces other prominent twentieth-century black figures and 
develops them as people, which allows for a better comparison of Garvey. Mentioning the black 
leaders tangentially would limit the reader’s ability to make informed opinions about them. 
The Age of Garvey (2016) illustrates that Pan-Africanism, attempts at black self-
determination, and the desire for centralized leadership existed throughout the African diaspora 
and on the continent, rather than mainly in the United States, as is often taught. Not only does the 
book provide a more in-depth look into Marcus Garvey’s ideology and efforts, but this particular 
author has made the decision to humanize him, rather than dismissing him as radical or short-
sighted and destined for failure. This approach differs from this reviewer’s previous encounters 
with versions of the Garvey story, which often depict the leader as overly ambitious and as a 
cautionary tale of one wanting too much for one’s people too quickly. Despite Garvey’s efforts 
having failed, there is much to be learned from a man who inspired a movement to make an 
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